СОНГУУЛЬ БА ТӨСВИЙН ЗАРЛАГА ХООРОНДЫН ХАМААРЛЫГ ТОДОРХОЙЛОХ НЬ

Authors

  • Саранцэцэг Э. Улс төр судлалын тэнхимийн ахлах багш, доктор
  • Энх-Амгалан Б. МУИС, БС-ийн Санхүүгийн тэнхимийн дэд профессор, АБСХ-ийн гэрээт судлаач

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22353/PS20261.12

Keywords:

elections, political budget cycle, state budget, budget expenditure, democracy, political economy, Mongolia

Abstract

In democratic systems, politicians are continuously motivated to secure public approval and electoral success, with prevailing economic conditions serving as a primary determinant of electoral outcomes. To enhance their prospects of reelection, incumbents frequently adopt expansionary fiscal policies-increasing wages, pensions, and social welfare transfers-thereby inflating public expenditures during election years. While such measures may generate short-term economic stimulus and yield measurable improvements in citizen welfare, they pose considerable risks to long-term macroeconomic stability, particularly when expenditure growth is driven by political incentives rather than productivity-enhancing investment. Drawing on the theoretical framework of the Political Budget Cycle (PBC), this study empirically examines the relationship between parliamentary election years and government expenditure in Mongolia over the period 1996-2025. Using a time-series econometric model with a binary electoral dummy variable, the findings confirm a statistically significant increase in budget expenditure during election years compared to non-election years-an effect that has intensified in the more recent sub-period of 2012-2025. These results suggest that fiscal discipline is vulnerable to electoral pressures in the Mongolian context, with implications for institutional reform and the design of credible budgetary constraints.

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Published

2026-03-26

How to Cite

Э., С., & Б., Э.-А. (2026). СОНГУУЛЬ БА ТӨСВИЙН ЗАРЛАГА ХООРОНДЫН ХАМААРЛЫГ ТОДОРХОЙЛОХ НЬ . Politology, 24(633), 194–204. https://doi.org/10.22353/PS20261.12