

The Tulku Institution and Future of Buddhism in Mongolia

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Abstract. This article considers the restoration of the tulku institution in contemporary Mongolia in the context of the processes taking place in the world of Tibetan Buddhism. The restoration of the *khuvilgaan* institution in Mongolia has the potential to strengthen the Mongolian Sangha and increase its authority in the Tibetan Buddhist world. However, further development depends largely on two important factors. First, much has to do with the restoration of the Jetsun Damba Khutugtu Institution in Mongolia. Second, the future of the Dalai Lama institution could also have a major impact on the situation inside Mongolia.

Since the early 1990s, Mongolia has been in the process of rebuilding Buddhist institutions. The revival of the tulku (*khuvilgaan*) institution takes an important place in this process. The tulku institution in the modern world is an extremely curious phenomenon. Being a product of medieval society that appeared in response to certain conditions of the time, this institution did not sink into oblivion together with the Mongolian and Tibetan theocracies. Moreover, according to Dr. Lopez, in the middle of the twentieth century, many leaders of the Tibetan Sangha in exile, among whom were well-known tulkus, approved a moratorium on the discovery of new tulkus. In other words the representatives of this institution themselves actually recognized its problematic nature, but ten years later the ban was violated and new tulkus began to appear.¹ This vitality of the tulku institution indicates that it continues to play an important function in Tibetan Buddhism. This is due to the fact that, as I will show in more detail below, the tulku institution provides legitimacy to religious figures largely at the expense of status, without requiring from its owner outstanding achievements.

This institution has been closely associated with politics since its very inception in the 13th century. This connection was further strengthened under the Fifth Dalai Lama, under whom Tibet finally becomes a theocracy. During the Qing Empire, Lhasa became an important religious center. Under the influence of the Fifth Dalai Lama Tibetan Buddhism spread throughout the Empire, including Mongolia. Thus the tulku institution took root there.

These two factors - the legitimization of religious figures and the close connection with politics - are both a strength and a weakness of the institution.

¹ The Tulku Institution in Tibetan Buddhism: A Symposium at USF, February 15 & 16, 2013. Accessed August 04, 2019. <http://tsadra-wp.tsadra.org/2013/02/20/the-tulku-institution-in-tibetan-buddhism-a-symposium-at-usf-february-15-16-2013>.

By the early twentieth century, the Mongols had 243 khuvilgaans, 147 of them in Inner Mongolia and 35 in Kokonur.² The main tulku and the head of the Sangha in Outer Mongolia was Jetsun Damba Khutugtu. Besides him there were 13 khutugtus with seals, i.e., officially recognized by the Manchu authorities. The Eighth Bogdo Gegeen played a major role in the struggle for independence of Mongolia and headed the Mongolian theocratic state in 1911-1924. The Eighth Jalkhanz Khutugtu was one of the most famous, revered and wealthy khuvilgaans in the country, twice held the post of Prime Minister. The Sixth Manjushri Khutugtu S. Tserendorj (1872-1937) was a prominent religious and political figure of Mongolia, its fourth Prime Minister. Previous Eguzer Khutugtu Galsnadash (1870-1930) was also a Minister in the government of the theocratic Mongolia.

The Eighth Bogdo Gegeen passed away in 1924. After his death the new revolutionary forces that had come to power three years ago adopted new Constitution and proclaimed Mongolian People's Republic. The Seventh Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and the Fifth Great People's Khural adopted a resolution banning the search for the next reincarnation of Bogdo Gegeen. At the end of the 1930s during the anti-religious campaign almost all Buddhist institutions in Mongolia, including the tulku institution were destroyed.

This did not mean the disappearance of the Buddhist tradition as a whole. Many lamas, even going to the secular way of life, continued Buddhist practice at the household level, could teach local people. In addition, in 1944 authorities opened again the Gandan monastery in Ulaanbaatar, it had its own community. Furthermore, there were even khuvilgaans during the socialist period. For example, Tserendondov Khuvilgaan and Khuukhen Khutugtu O. Tagarva.

Tserendondov Khuvilgaan was born in 1919 on the territory of Zavkhan aimag. At the age of five, he was recognized as the fourth reincarnation of the famous Tibetan poet and yogin Milarepa and enthroned in the local monastery. As a result of the anti-religious policy of the new state, he was forced to switch to a secular way of life. But believers continued to honor him as the last of the surviving major lamas.³

The Eight Khuukhen Khutugtu Ooloi Tagarva was born in 1944 in Dundgovi aimag. In 1960 one of the former lamas recognized him as the incarnation of Khuukhen Khutugtu. Until 1990, this information was kept secret, but a former Lama, a friend of his father, personally instructed him in Dharma. Most of his life O. Tagarva worked as herdsman. Only in 1990 he was officially enthroned as Khuukhen Khutugtu in the monastery of Delgeriin Choir, he was 46 years old. The important

² Монголын бурхны шашин. Accessed August 14, 2019. <https://ikon.mn/n/fc1>

³ Милово бурханы хувилгаан Цэрэндондов. Accessed August 14, 2019. http://zashiluustei.pms.mn/index.php?module=menu&cmd=content&id=67&menu_id=42

fact is that O. Tagarva became one of the first officially recognized reincarnations, found and approved not by the Dalai Lama, but by the Mongolian lamas.⁴

These two examples also clearly show that these two men, while lacking formal religious education and religious achievements, were nevertheless held in high esteem by the believers because of their tulku status.

In the 1990s, the restoration of Buddhist institutions in Mongolia began. On September 20, 1991, the Dalai Lama officially confirmed the existence of the incarnation of the Ninth Bogdo Gegeen. On 13 January 1992, his enthronement ceremony was held in Dharamsala in the presence of senior lamas, tulkus and officials.⁵ But the Mongolian government regarded it an interference of the Tibetan diaspora to the internal affairs of the country. As a result in 1995, the National Security Council of Mongolia refused to issue a visa to Bogdo Gegeen.⁶ He managed to visit the country only in 1999 on a tourist visa. During that visit, a number of Mongolian monks held the enthronement ceremony of Bogdo Gegeen at the Erdeni Dzu monastery. At the same time, the Khambo Lama of the Gandan monastery - the center of Mongolian Buddhists – did not participate in the event, and the government issued an official condemnation⁷. Only on November 2, 2011, the Ninth Bogdo Gegeen was enthroned for the second time as the head of Mongolian Buddhists at the Gandan monastery. This time the Khambo Lama of the Gandan as well as other high lamas and authorities were present. Bogdo Gegeen did not stay in his new status for long – on March 1, 2012 he passed away.

According to Khambo Lama Choijamts, before his death Bogdo said that “...my next rebirth will appear in Mongolia and will accomplish my great deeds. ...Secondly, the affairs of the state do not interest me in any way. Therefore, my future reincarnation in the slightest capacity will not be interested in politics, and will only do the works of faith...”⁸ This clarification that his future incarnation will not be involved in politics is very revealing and is intended primarily for Mongolian politicians and statesmen, who may be afraid of attempts, if not to restore the theocracy, then significantly influence politics. Thus, the political component of the tulku institution is not only still relevant, but also causes fears among politicians.

⁴ Говийн багш. О.Тагарваагийн тухай хөрөг дурьдатгал. (Улаанбаатар хот, 2016), 201.

⁵ Кузьмин С.Л., Оюунчимэг Ж. *Краткая биография Его Святейшества Богдо-гэгэна IX Джеб-цзундамба-хутухты*. Сохраним Тибет!, 14 января 2011. Accessed June 14, 2019. http://savetibet.ru/2011/01/14/bogdo_gegen.html

⁶ Lhagvademchig J. Shastri. *Double Headed Mongolian Buddhism*, February 28, 2018. Accessed July 24, 2019. <http://theecessblog.com/2018/02/double-headed-mongolian-buddhism-by-lhagvademchig-j-shastri-visiting-researcher-university-of-shiga-prefecture>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Нэргуй В. Интервью с Хамбо-ламой Гандана Чойжамцем о последних днях и предсказаниях Богдо-гэгэна IX (2 марта 2012 года). Accessed August 14, 2019. http://oros-oros.blogspot.com/2012/03/ix_03.html

Since the early 1990s, 20 *huvilgaans* have been identified and approved by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Jetsun Damba *Khutugtu*: *Diluwa Khutugtu*, *Zaya Gegeen*, *Gachen Khuvilgaan*, *Jalkhanz Khutugtu*, *Gushri Khuvilgaan*, *Jonan Khanchen Khuvilgaan*, *Lamyn Gegeen*, *Manzushir Khutugtu*, *Sraidorj Nomun Khan*, *Banbar Erdene Khutugtu*, *Barigri Khuvilgaan*, *Noen Khutugtu*, *Darba Pandita Khutugtu*, *Narobanchin Gegeen*, *Jamyangarav Gegeen*, *Eguzer Khutugtu*, *Sengee Rinpoche*, *Erdene Bishrelt Mergen Pandita*, *Yalguusan Khutugtu*, *Haraagiin Dar Ekhiin Khuvilgaan*.

There is no much information about many of them, so as they still quite young (although *Zaya Gegeen* already passed away) and study in India. As a rule, the search for new incarnation begins on the initiative of the believers themselves. They refer to the Dalai Lama or *Bogdo Gegeen* (while he was alive). Believers ask the Dalai Lama to identify a new *khuvilgaan*. At his request, believers or monks send the names of potential candidates born in aimag to the Dalai Lama. After some time he tells the name. Some of the newly found *khuvilgaans* were already lamas, some were children who had nothing to do with religion. Most of the new Mongolian *khuvilgaans* study in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in India. The main problem for young *khuvilgaans* is integration into the Mongolian Buddhist community. If before the famous *tulku* had his monastery and *shav'nars*, as well as the treasury, now some *khuvilgaans* are deprived of this and cannot fully participate in the religious life of the country and influence it. But at the same time some *khuvilgaans* are supported by believers, and have their own foundations.

One of the reasons why this medieval *tulku* institution is still relevant in the 21st century is that it offers a relatively simple and reliable method of legitimizing religious status. The Buddhist Sangha in Mongolia was virtually destroyed as a result of the anti-religious campaign of the 1930s. The processes of modernization and secularization undermined the position of religion as a whole. The authority of lamas among the population is not so high. Often Mongolian monks are accused of violating the rules of *Vinaya* and of low level of their training. To gain trust and authority among believers requires many years of training and raising the level of respect of the Sangha in general. *Tulku* institution in these conditions offers a good alternative. Here a religious figure gains authority in the eyes of the believers due to his status as a *tulku*. His personal qualities and abilities fade into the background. Believers see in him not only a particular person, but also his outstanding predecessors. Thus the connection with the past is built, through the present incarnation in which previous incarnations are manifested people get connected with the history of Buddhism in Mongolia, Tibet and India, become involved in the glorious times of Buddhism. This also contributes to the development of Buddhism in Mongolia and increases the authority of the Mongolian Sangha in the world.

One of the main features of the institution is that it is translocal in nature. It goes beyond nation state, because usually the tulku lineage goes back to prominent figures of Indian Buddhism, continues in Tibet, then comes to Mongolia. Some tulkus still operate at the transnational level. Telo Tulku Rinpoche is a prime example.

Formally, Telo Tulku is primarily associated with Buddhism in Russia, but at the same time he has historical ties with Mongolia and plays a significant role in the restoration of Buddhist institutions in Mongolia, he has a lot of followers there.

Telo Tulku Rinpoche (Ombadykov Erdni Basanovic) was born in 1972 in a family of Kalmyk emigrants in the USA. Already in childhood he wanted to become a Buddhist monk. On the advice of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama parents sent him to study at the Drepung Goman monastery in India. In the late 1980s, he was recognized as an incarnation of Diluwa Khutugtu XI Jamsranjav (1884-1965) - a famous Mongolian religious figure who died in exile in the United States. In 1992, Telo Tulku was elected Supreme Lama of Kalmykia (Shajin Lama), and later – the representative of the Dalai Lama in Russia and CIS countries. A considerable part of his activity connected with Mongolia. First, he is connected with it by his previous incarnation, secondly, the Oirats live in the West of Mongolia, and thirdly, as a representative of the Dalai Lama, he carries out various projects there and accompanies him on trips to Mongolia.⁹ In 2007, the Naropa and Tilopa Buddhist center in Mongolia asked Telo Tulku to lead a project to restore the Narobanchen Buddhist monastery, which belonged to previous Diluwa Khutugtu.¹⁰ In 2009, Telo Tulku made a trip to Mongolia, visiting Buddhist monasteries and centers of Ulaanbaatar and Zavkhan Aimag (where the previous Diluwa Khutugtu lived), where several thousand people came to his lecture and teachings.¹¹ Following the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and as his representative, Telo Tulku Rinpoche stresses that “Mongolia is a free Buddhist country capable of taking patronage over Buddhist teaching in the world.”¹²

The situation is complicated by the fact that in Mongolia there are reincarnations recognized not by the Dalai Lama, but by his opponents, that is, they are not under the control of the Dalai Lama. This is the group of the Dorje Shugden¹³ followers. They appeared in post-socialist Mongolia thanks to Guru Deva Rinpoche's efforts. This is a prominent Mongolian Lama, who played an important role in the history of the

⁹ Тэло Тулку Ринпоче о визите в Монголию. Интервью монгольскому телеканалу «Образование». Accessed August 14, 2019. <http://khurul.ru/2009/09/telo-tulku-rinpoche-o-vizite-v-mongoliyu>

¹⁰ Тэло Тулку Ринпоче. Accessed August 24, 2019. <http://khurul.ru/Шаджин-лама/telo-tulku-rinpoche/>

¹¹ Тур Верховного ламы Калмыкии по Монголии. Accessed May 14, 2019. <http://khurul.ru/2009/07/tur-verhovnogo-lamy-kalmykii-po-mongolii>

¹² Интервью Шаджин ламы Калмыкии Тэло Тулку Ринпоче Монгольскому телевидению. Accessed March 23, 2019. <http://khurul.ru/2009/03/testpage-747>

¹³ Dreyfus, Georges. "The Shugden Affair: Origins of a Controversy". *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*. IABS. 21 (2 (1998)): 227–270.

Tibetan diaspora in India, as well as influenced the history of Buddhism in modern Mongolia.

Guru Deva Rinpoche, also known as Sokpu Rinpoche, was born in Ordos (Inner Mongolia) in 1908. As a child, he was recognized and enthroned as the tulku of one of the 84 Indian mahasiddhas.¹⁴ In 1928, at the age of 20, he went to Drepung monastery in Tibet, where he studied under the guidance of leading Gelug mentors of the twentieth century. Guru Deva Rinpoche did not agree with the Dalai Lama's call to stop worshipping Dorje Shugden and, having been in opposition since 1986, was forced to leave India at the age of 78. In 1991 he came to Mongolia, where the restoration of Buddhist institutions had just begun, and lived there until his death in 2009. Possessing great authority and means, Sokpu Rinpoche made a considerable contribution to the development of Buddhism in Mongolia, in particular, thanks to him, the Amarbayasgalant monastery was restored. But at the same time, taking advantage of the weakness of the Mongolian Sangha and the inexperience of believers, Guru Deva Rinpoche rooted the cult of Dorje Shugden there, thus laying the foundation for future disagreements. The main disciple and follower of Sokpu Rinpoche in Mongolia was N. Osgonbayar, whom Rinpoche recognized as the khuvilgaan of the famous Mongolian scholar, philosopher and historian Lama Zava Damdin.

Today, Zava Damdin is one of the most popular Mongolian tulkus, gathering thousands of believers in his teachings and lectures.¹⁵ Zava Damdin is quite critical of the Khambo Lama Choijamts and anyone who focuses on the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan teachers. He claims that neither he nor his teachers chose any of Choijamts nor the Dalai Lama the head of Buddhism in Mongolia.¹⁶ From his point of view, Buddhism in Mongolia has a long history and one should follow what the old Mongolian lamas taught, and not become a conductor of external influences. That, however, does not prevent him from regularly inviting Tibetan lamas to Mongolia.

It is obvious that Zava Damdin is speaking from a more nationalist position. At the heart of his criticism are fears that the lamas of the Gandan monastery, the main center of Mongolian Buddhists, want to subordinate Mongolian Buddhism to the Tibetan Buddhist diaspora, embed it in the hierarchy of the Tibetan Sangha led by the Dalai Lama. His position is that Mongolian Buddhism is an independent religious tradition.¹⁷

¹⁴ His Eminence Sokpu Rinpoche. Accessed August 4, 2019. <http://www.dorjeshugden.org/lamas/sokpu-rinpoche>

¹⁵ Зава Дамдин Ринбүчи: Далай ламыг хүлээн зөвшөөрдөг улс Монголоос өөр хаана байгаа юм? //Sonin.mn agency, 19.04.2017. Accessed July 13, 2019. <http://www.sonin.mn/news/politics-economy/76889>

¹⁶ Сайхан Т. Ц, Батмөнх: З.Санждорж, Х.Баасансүрэн, Огсонбаяр лам нарын үнэн төрхийг илчлэх болно. Accessed July 13, 2019. <http://polit.mn/20604>

¹⁷ King, Matthew. "Finding the Buddha Hidden below the Sand: Youth, Identity and Narrative in the Revival of Mongolian Buddhism" in Change in Democratic Mongolia, pp.17-29. Leiden, The Netherlands: BRILL, 2012.

However, for Zawa Damdin (though to a lesser extent), and for the Mongolian khuvilgaans in general, the source of legitimacy is outside. For the former, it is the Tibetan monks who follow Dorje Shugden, for the latter, it is the Dalai Lama who finds and approves new incarnations.

In November 2016, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, during his visit to Mongolia, stated that the Tenth Jebtsun Damba Khutugtu was born in the country and the process of his identification began, but did not disclose any details.¹⁸ But it is already clear that the new khutugtu is a Mongolian. This is one of the main conditions from the point of view of the Mongolian authorities and the population as a whole. The story of the return of the Ninth Bogdo to Mongolia vividly demonstrated this.

For the Chinese government the emergence of the Tenth Bogdo Gegeen, recognized by the current Dalai Lama, creates an alternative source of power and influence to China. Actually he spoils the attempts of the Chinese authorities to take control over Tibetan Buddhism. After the death of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Bogdo Gegeen will be the only supreme hierarch in the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, since the Chinese Panchen does not enjoy authority among the believers, the Karmapas' positions are weakened by the scandal, the heads of other schools do not play a significant role in the world of Tibetan Buddhism beyond their own schools. Some Chinese authors describe the restoration of the Jetsun Damba Khutugtu institution as a “great victory and breakthrough of the Dalai clique,” which happened with the participation of the “Indian government and the CIA.”¹⁹

The Chinese authorities have long been trying to interfere in religious affairs and control the processes in the Tibetan Sangha. The main goal has been the control over the Dalai Lama's next rebirth or the future of the Dalai Lama institution in principle. It began with the tragic story of the incarnation of the Panchen Lama. In 1995, six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima was chosen as a new Panchen by the Dalai Lama. Chinese authorities learned about it and three days later he had disappeared with his whole family. On December 8, 1995, China announced six-year-old Gyaltzen Norbu was the new Panchen Lama. Then there were attempts with the Karmapa, but he fled from China, now the main stake is the Dalai Lama. China has made it clear that it will find its Dalai Lama. The Chinese Communist Party passed laws (New Regulations on Religious Affairs and the Rules on the Management of the Reincarnation of Tibetan Living Buddhas) banning reincarnations without prior approval from the government. The highest reincarnations including the Dalai Lama

¹⁸ Mongolia reassures China against Dalai Lama revisit, 10th Khalkha Jetsun Dhamba approval. Tibet-anReview.net, January 26, 2017. Accessed July 13, 2019. <http://www.tibetanreview.net/mongolia-re-assures-china-against-dalai-lama-revisit-10th-khalkha-jetsun-dhamba-approval/>

¹⁹ Lulu, Jichang. *Thinking outside the Urn: China and the reincarnation of Mongolia's highest lama*. March 21, 2017. Accessed July 23, 2019. <https://jichanglulu.wordpress.com/2017/03/21/urn>

must be approved by the central government.²⁰ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said: “The institution of reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has been in existence for several hundred years — the Fourteenth Dalai Lama himself was found and recognized following religious rituals and historical conventions, and his succession was approved by the then Central Government. Therefore reincarnation of living Buddhas including the Dalai Lama must comply with Chinese laws and regulations and follow religious rituals and historical conventions.”²¹

The Dalai Lama, trying to avoid this, offers different options. In recent years, he suggested that he might reincarnate as a female, or be reborn in a country outside of Chinese government control, or that he might not reincarnate at all. In 2004, the Dalai Lama in an interview said that “The institution of the Dalai Lama, and whether it should continue or not, is up to the Tibetan people. If they feel it is not relevant, then it will cease and there will be no Fifteenth Dalai Lama.”²²

During a meeting with students in Dharamsala on 25 October 2019, the Dalai Lama suggested that the tulku institution may be coming to an end.²³ He added that, “Institutions need to be owned by the people, not by an individual. Like my own institution, the Dalai Lama’s office, I feel like it is linked to a feudal system. The system should end, or at least change with the changing times”.²⁴

Here the political component of the tulku institution was fully manifested. And it concerns not only Tibetan-Chinese relations. The US is closely monitoring developments. James McGovern, chairman of the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China introduced The Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019 in Congress on September 13, 2019. It threatens sanctions against Chinese officials who interfere with the selection of a new Dalai Lama. The bill proposed penalties including the freezing of assets and denial of entry to the United States.²⁵ Senator Cory Gardner said that “the United States Congress will never recognize a Dalai Lama that is selected by the Chinese. His Holiness has laid out [his] succession. Only then will the US follow that succession.”²⁶

²⁰ Shaw, Steve. *The Future of the Dalai Lama and Tibet*. April 23, 2019. Accessed June 15, 2019. <http://globalcomment.com/the-future-of-the-dalai-lama-and-tibet/>

²¹ Handley, Erin. *Dalai Lama says he could be reincarnated in India, but Beijing says rebirth must follow Chinese rules*. Accessed July 1, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-21/dalai-lama-says-he-could-be-reincarnated-in-india/10923354>

²² Shaw, Steve. *The Future of the Dalai Lama and Tibet*. April 23, 2019. Accessed June 15, 2019. <http://globalcomment.com/the-future-of-the-dalai-lama-and-tibet/>

²³ Whitaker, Justin. *Dalai Lama Hints at a Possible End to the Reincarnate Lama System*. Buddhistdoor Global, 2019-10-29. Accessed November 15, 2019. <https://www.buddhistdoor.net/news/dalai-lama-hints-at-a-possible-end-to-the-reincarnate-lama-system>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Dalai Lama’s Successor Will be Chosen by Tibetans, not by China: US Envoy. Accessed November 1, 2019. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/chosen-10282019145243.html>

²⁶ Shaw, Steve. *The Future of the Dalai Lama and Tibet*. April 23, 2019. Accessed June 15, 2019. <http://globalcomment.com/the-future-of-the-dalai-lama-and-tibet/>

It is evident that under current conditions it is impossible to find pro-Tibetan Dalai Lama in Tibet. The Chinese government will not allow this. In turn, the pro-Chinese Dalai Lama will not be respected among believers, both Tibetans and others. The end to the Dalai Lama lineage looks like an alternative that can be acceptable to China even more than to the Tibetans because then Chinese government does not have to constantly involve into Buddhist matters all over the world. But the decision to find its own Dalai Lama goes far beyond Tibetan-Buddhist relationships and concerns all the countries in the region where Tibetan Buddhism is present. In other words it has clear geopolitical implications.

It is unlikely that the end of the Dalai Lama lineage will end the tulku institution itself. The Dalai Lama does not have any direct authority over other reincarnated teachers, either within his own Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, or in any other tradition.

For Mongolia, which is apprehensive about the growth of Chinese presence in the economy and other spheres, this is an extremely undesirable prospect. In addition, for Mongolian believers, especially the newly found tulkus, ending the Dalai Lama institution would be highly destabilizing. Potentially, this will strengthen the position of those lamas who do not follow the Dalai Lama. At the same time, it can also become a factor of even greater strengthening of the Mongolian Sangha. The appearance of its Bogdo Gegeen, independent of the PRC, will lead to the fact that the highest authority in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism will be in Mongolia.

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