

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES' DRAFTS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF MONGOLIA**

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Abstract: Within the framework of this research, we have set an objective to display a short summary of the analysis on Mongolian parliament, a brief introduction of political parties' versions of governance in constitution, and tendencies of public opinions as well as explaining the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential systems.

Key words: Constitution, presidential institution, parliament, government, cabinet principles, political institutions, bicameral parliament structure, power

Introduction

Since its adoption of new Constitution in 1992, Mongolia has transferred into democracy and market economy. All political parties even public, and researchers appraise the constitutional role that performed over last two decades. Though, from today's points of view, a wide range of judgement comes around the current constitutional role of regulating political institutions and directing social, economic and political relations of the country. The criticism comes not only from public but also from political experts, civic society activists and political parties. Focus of the judgement mainly concentrates on politicians and their personal behaviour and actions that blamed for the failure of socio-economic development (poverty, unemployment, uneven distribution of social resource etc.); break of social injustice (failure of social ethical

principles and norms, increase of crime, bribed judiciary system, rise of oligarchic and criminal groups etc.) and for the rise of bureaucracy, however, none has accused or penalized yet for these actions. Finally, for the recent 5-6 years, they have been blaming political system and the constitution for the above mentioned phenomena; therefore, political parties and political forces have developed several drafts of Constitution for public discussion. The contents of those criticism mainly concentrated on the following issues:

1. Critiques related to the Presidential institution:

- Negative consequence comes from the presidential power which in fact stronger and more than common trends and models of the countries with parliamentary governance,
- Constitutional right on appointment of the President transferred judicial and legal organizations into the control of oligarchy,
- Requirement of improving the power of the President as it is less powerful to make veto rights on bills and law drafts,

2. Criticism on unicameral Parliament (or State Great Khural of Mongolia):

- Poor state of Parliament members' responsibility, ethical standards, knowledge and skills,
- Mongolian Parliament has been affected by lobbies of foreign and domestic groups which conflicts with national interests,
- Due to overwhelming power of the Parliament, government is unable to implement any of its policies and programs,
- Proposal of bicameral Parliament structure,

3. Criticism on unstable and less powerful government, and exceeded centralization of public administrations:

- Proposal of making governmental power to be enjoyed by Cabinet principles,
- To decentralize executive power,
- To make amendments to the Constitution in order to enhance mutual control and balances between the powers and responsibilities of Parliament, Government, and President,

There were many other critiques and proposals; however, we emphasize the above ideas by their frequency and importance among the others.

The objective of this research paper is to give explanations about the structure and organizational roles of legislative, executive, and judicial powers on theoretical and practical backgrounds at the institutional and power distribution

levels as Mongolian parliament system is different from classic parliament system. Mongolia has unicameral structure of the president and representatives elected by public election. According to Chimed B, Mongolia has a “semi” or “mixed” structure of political governance¹. The political governance is generally organized on basis of many internal and external factors. Structure and organization of Mongolian governance, control and balance of power separation have made the average duration of Mongolian cabinets about two years for recent 30 years; therefore, it has made to increase a public criticism. On the other hand, some opponents express to step back from parliamentary government and democracy, and shift into presidential governance with the intention of establishing authoritarian regime. Within the framework of this research, we have set an objective to display a short summary of the analysis on Mongolian parliament, a brief introduction of political parties’ versions of governance in constitution, and tendencies of public opinions as well as explaining the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential systems.

Theoretical and practical backgrounds

In order to understand the structure of political institutions, it is necessary to review its political backgrounds. According to the political scientists, political governance that has two main sources: the first is a society or a civil society by modern terms, while the second source is aristocracy or elites.

The first source is based on the demands to regulate property and private law disputes between persons united by the geographical locations and to improve the results of the law enforcement.

The next source of governance is bad or oppressing as we call an elite or authoritarian regime, which is a group of people, joined on basis of their geographical location (worksites and natural reserves). These governors, whether they are political elites, governing classes, managers, or feudal governors, no matter who they are, want to rob treasures from its governed people. In order to reach their will and objectives, the governors have to establish 4 kinds of institutions: first, to create rule of law for its’ governed; secondly, to fulfill desires of the governor; third, to settle disputes between governors and its’ subjects; and fourth, to lay responsibilities and penalties on those, whoever is against the governor.

¹ Chimed B. *Ard tumnii bureн erht baidal ба турiin somgolt, tsaashdiin sorilt*. Huuli deedleh yos. №3. 2007 (18). p.7.

Before choosing which of these two governances are correct or better, we have to recognize that the political institutions are the same in both types of government. Both types of democratic and non-democratic system need policy-making and executive institutions, an institution for the solution of further actions, and an institution to penalize law breakers.

Institution is one of the natural images of people in a society and considers like unchangeable image of their life; however, the research on institution from the points of view in social sciences considers the institution like a social organization, as a fact of certain historical period, and as a social and cultural composite created by the options and choice of group of people instead of individual choice.

It is impossible to explain the consequences of interrelations between President, Parliament, and Cabinet without touching the issue of power. The word “power” is polysemic; however, two of these meanings are important here: First, the word “power” expresses a capacity, of a legal right to implement the necessary tasks and an availability of financial, human resource, and organizational property reserves; secondly, power is a relation issue: in order to contact with executive power, it is necessary to have sufficient power to set an independent and efficient control on it; however, a power centralization usually becomes a main reason to create oppressions. Still worse, too much power spoils the personality. Montesquieu has once emphasized, “There can be no liberty when accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicial powers are in the same hands”².

The main role of parliament is legislation; however, it plays administrative or judicial roles sometimes. It is generally different and resolved under the Constitution where budget approval and other major policy issues like social and economic decisions are made through parliament session for and on behalf of executive power. Similarly, parliament may play a role of court in the solution to political complaints. Parliament is generally established through election. In some parliamentary states, for instance in UK, members for the highest legislative organ is selected through this model. Especially in continental Europe (including Eastern European post-communist countries that democratized late in the 20th century), members are elected through several proportional representation formula³. There are many other detailed versions and explanations on the proportional representation; however, this method is chiefly suitable for multi-party

² Nyamsuren Ch., *Erh zui, turiin yerunhii onol*. UB., 1998. pp.108

³ In some parliamentary democracies like Germany, Japan and New Zealand, there is a mixed electoral system where some part of MPs wins seat with majority vote while the others are in Parliament as a result of proportional representative formula.

system⁴. Parliament seats are shared into the many parties instead of two parties; therefore, one party rarely wins the majority of seats. In many countries of parliamentary system, it is necessary to negotiate with several parties in order to establish a Cabinet with exception of few cases in UK and other countries, where one party made the majority of the Parliament.

In parliaments of various developed and developing countries have different resources and tools. Limited budget of developing countries are lack of sources for other development demands. Parliament members do not find it as a serious question to concern. Many developing countries are lack not only of reserves, but also professional staffs with sufficient knowledge and skills; therefore, it becomes a reason for failures in normal operation of the parliament. For instance: Mongolian parliament resolutions, laws and rules has not been studied and analyzed at professional level, therefore, it is common to serve for emotional and populist, or limited interests.

Action frequency of democratic parliament generally starts from election. New parliament is usually created with the composites of many parties' representatives; however, these parties do not always win majority of seats. Each political party has rights and chances to set its control on certain numbers of seats and to implement own policy and programs through the public polls conducted during the election campaign⁵. Meanwhile, the cabinet keeps the governance and still holds its power and runs the country. The first urgent issue for the new parliament is a solution whether to retain the previous cabinet or to replace it with a new one. When representatives of several parties are changed by election results, a New Cabinet is likely to be organized; however, if no party can create a majority of the Parliament, the new parliament seeks a collaboration and coalition of political parties. A formation of new government requires coalition⁶.

Parliament needs to keep checks and balances while collaborating with executive government; certainly, too much interference does not meet with public interests. Unfortunately, modern executive governance enjoys illegal privilege that might become a

⁴Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁵In effect, each party may be treated as a unitary actor. Despite American political parties with wide ranged politics and members with better freedom to support their own policy and objectives, parliamentary parties chiefly have united policies whereas political leaders enjoy a strong mechanism to support their policy and objectives. As I previously mentioned in Article 14, the leader of political parties with seats at the Parliament must pay a special attention to make their supporters and followers happy and satisfied. However, they might make their action to be the most efficient for their party. As a consequence, we may think that political parties with seats run their operational activities on basis of their carefully determined list and order of values and legal interests; however, they can also be based on the actions, and believes of their party leaders.

⁶ Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Analyzing politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York, 2nd ed.. 10. W.W.Norton & Company. 506-508

dangerous threat which most likely resulted within sufficient skills of the parliament or unwillingness of using parliamentary power.

It is widely accepted that parliament should be independent from the executive government on some issues such as to select and control own ways of organization and internal timetable, and to enjoy a chance to announce extraordinary session other than regular sessions in case of necessity. It is one of the most differences of presidential and parliamentary systems in general.

All the political parties in the parliament have a representation in one of the committees; however, the party politics may spoil any committee's abilities to enforce joint control on government agencies. In addition, different interests inside the party do not mean all these interests must be expressed openly in the public. When members of the party touch any issues that might poke the Government into the hard condition or to threaten the internal unity of the party, the level of party membership and behavior level usually show obstacles. Members usually base on the political party in order to get involved into the list of the political party and to be elected as a parliament member; therefore, the administrations of the political parties may require their members to be fair and set hard discipline. It may also obstacle the committee to implement their controlling assignments efficiently.

Parliament can't set controls on the executive governance as an organization of even density; all the control shall be a struggle and competition between the parties. It will also depend on the ways how the public accept it. For instance, minority in the legislative organ or counter forces generally "strengthen" the different types of control at required level, which is generally enforced through official or unofficial "shadow government" in Westminster system.

The way of parliament committees control ministries and other governmental organizations, and inspects the special policy issues are the most systemized method of the control on the executive power. The committee had a parallel structure with the relevant governmental organizations, and parliaments update their committee system in order to grant their members with the opportunities to improve their knowledge and skills in the fields of the parallel structure. In many bicameral parliaments, there are joint committees of both chambers. Even they are professional committees, it is impossible to involve the works of the relevant organizations completely. On practice, certain issues are chosen; however, the ministry and organizations should know that the committee might check and inspect any issues, still worse in the very strict ways sufficient to enhance report the responsibilities.

A brief summary of analysis on problems of Mongolian Parliament

In order to give theoretical and practical explanations to the issues expressing the main contents of the critics and discussions, we have used theoretical and system methods and behavioral methodologies:

One. The following actions and tendencies express the issue it brings negative consequences when the presidential power is more than common models of classic parliamentary system:

- 1) The President is elected through public election; therefore, it shows negative influences on the executive governance thereby seeming as there are two heads for executive governance. For instance, a part of executive governance that includes the court, prosecutor's office, corruption, intelligence, police, and legal resolution organizations and agencies, is dependent upon presidential appointment. It creates a condition to make pressures on the political opponents through corruption and fake cases such as "Injustice tunnel", Anod Bank case, and etc.
- 2) When President interferes and plays a decisive role into the appointment of the judicial governance and administration of force organizations, it spoils judicial independence and sovereignty and allows force organizations to serve for "governing"⁷ political forces through "peepholes" in the relevant laws. You can see the evidence from Zorig's case, Capla case and many other cases.
- 3) When the President enjoys a veto right on laws, it makes a reason for the president to give too subjective attitude to the law or have less restriction forces. For instance: "restoration of death penalty" issue has been introduced into the parliament. Still worse, election law has been amended for the interests of the ruling powers within 6 months before the election date. Many other cases can prove it.
- 4) The only advocate for the political forces that intends to increase the presidential power requires transferring a role of one chamber of bicameral Parliament to the President. Even logically it is impossible when presidential institution performs a role of entire representative chamber as it supports the authoritarian oppression that breaks the structure of democracy.

Two. Backgrounds for critical discussion on Parliament:

⁷Dominant political force – Oligarchy, mafia, and cartel domination "MANAN" consisting from leaders of two dominant parties has been protected by legal and legislative organizations for recent 20years.

1. Poor condition of responsibilities, ethics, and knowledge of parliament members are chiefly related to the absence of upper chamber with permanent activities and members specialized in political science and elected by proportional representatives and lower chamber of representatives. The House of Lords in UK plays a main role in a political decision making and legislation process; however, the House of Commons just reviews these bills and issues and resolves whether to accept it. One of the tragedies in our system is a representation of electors with great desire, believes, and trusts directly appears in the Parliament and adopts laws without deeply understanding the meaning and contents of the bills, and just learns at “parliamentary course” for 4 years. One disadvantage of democracy is absolute inadaptability of total representatives in the parliament⁸. For instance, “Lower House” or the House which directly elected from the public differs from Upper House or the House with inheritance and indirect election with their law initiating rights on finance whereas the lower house directly represents tax-payers.⁹
2. You can see the difference between unicameral and bicameral parliament in different countries. Most of these countries with unicameral parliament are included into the list of poor countries by GDP but very fewer of them are rich. Their wealth depends on different factors. For instance: Saudi Arabia and Qatar of absolute monarchy without any political parties and parliament earned from their mutually profitable contracts with developed countries during oil crisis in 1970s; however, Singapore has been granted with economic privilege thanks to harbor across Indian Ocean whereas Denmark exists between countries that have reached the higher level of social, economic, and cultural development; therefore, they can use unicameral parliament efficiently. Most of these countries with bicameral parliament are rich and medium level countries by their GDP rate for per person.
3. In comparison with bicameral parliament, unicameral parliament is easy to be lobbied during the law adoption process or by the groups harmful for national interests.
4. Recent comparative study on the democratic transition of post-communist countries have summarized that the level and quality of democracy is determined by the power and efficiency of legislatures rather than the system (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary). Where strong legislative there is a heavy control on executives and shows strong influences on the party maturity. The summary of the survey noted that

⁸ Charles Luis de Montesquieu, http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol_116htm#013

⁹ Hague et al., *Comparative Government and Politics*, 205

“a strong and powerful legislative organization might be the only key to the democracy”. “State structure with loose legislative organization urgently needs to make a constitutional reform and to strengthen a legislative organization.”¹⁰

5. The division of Parliament into two chambers is a classic regulation approved by ancient history. Montesquieu has once mentioned, “Legislative power consists of aristocratic and national representatives with different interests and different doctrines where both convene in separate places.”¹¹ Maurice Duverger has once mentioned, “The aim of two chambers is to strengthen conservative force or sustainability of the executive power”.¹² Nowadays, in UK, the power of the House of Lords is gradually reduced and the House of Commons enjoys the most of the political powers.¹³

Three. Tendencies of critics on unstable and powerless situation of government and over centralization of public administration:

- There is a strong tendency to make the government to work with Cabinet principles because Prime Minister’s appointment of his cabinet members is resolved by Parliament thereby making more dependent on the fractions in the Parliament; therefore, executive power is loosened, the ministers work without any common policies and programs, and serve for interests of limited lobby groups. It is similar in both cases of coalition government and one party winning the absolute majority. When one fraction within the party wins sufficient supports from its members, the Cabinet could be dismissed.¹⁴ In accordance with European experiences, the government with many prevailing political parties has to control its rating and documents in order to run sustainable activities; however, a simple fulfillment of this task is enough for keeping an order inside the party. In Mongolian case, when a political party that wins a majority of votes, forms a government and sets its cabinet, the most serious danger is representatives from one or more parties with seats in the Cabinet composites may make a proposal on the dismissal of the Cabinet or join the

¹⁰ M. Steven Fish, 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 17.1, Jan. 2006, 5-20

¹¹ Charles Luis de Montesquieu, http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol_116htm#013

¹² Duverger *Political Construction: Constitutional Law*, UB, 2007, Mon Sudar. 129-133.

¹³ Duverger *Political Construction: Constitutional Law*, UB, 2007, Mon Sudar. 130.

¹⁴ In 1994, UK Conservative Government’s Prime Minister John Major made its Cabinet united; however, his Cabinet existed only for shorter time. His party took fewer seats in the lower Chamber; therefore, they were very susceptible to receive a black letter. In fall 1994, Conservative Party made a proposal to dismiss the government during the parliament questionnaire to improve roles and participation of European Union. (This party supported the proposal to join European Union). Most of them ignored them and got a victory.

counter forces in case of dissatisfaction with the operational activities of the Cabinet Members.¹⁵It has become a common phenomenon in Mongolia that a fraction-dependent government is volatile due to those fractions. In Mongolian conditions, the governmental sustainability is vital for the implementation of the action programs of the ruling party.¹⁶One way to overcome such a condition is to make the Prime Minister to set his cabinet with the responsibilities of his cabinet.

- Ruling parties generally promise to take measures on the reducing public administrative centralization; they hardly keep their promises. It will stay just an empty promise when politicians and public administration officials strongly keep state-centered tendency and the relevant interests in their mentality. On the other hand, public office politicizing reserved through mass parties shows the necessity to get rid of mass party.
- Main critics tend to set mutual control and balances between powers and responsibilities of parliament, government, and president through amendments and reform in the Constitution. Within this framework, it becomes necessary to have a classic parliamentary system, where the president is elected from the parliament and to set limits on the power. It is necessary to establish bicameral parliament and to transmit presidential veto and law making rights, and judicial appointment rights to the House of Representatives. Head of the executive governance should also be granted with the rights to establish his/her cabinet and to dismiss the parliament.

A brief introduction of analysis conducted for the drafts of Constitution presented by political parties

Those, who misused their state power in order to obtain public treasures for own welfare, usually deteriorate the country, polished up own opportunities to use their state power and spoil the power of the state. More and more people criticize the situation that faced current political system and state institutions in Mongolia. Due to public criticism, political parties propose their versions to amend the Constitution of Mongolia. In general, public psychology has already been shifted to amend the 1992 Constitution and to change

¹⁵If the Government changes one from the ruling party, as we mentioned before, the Parliament shall not be necessary to dismiss the Cabinet. If the political parties in the Government are not sure to receive supports from the Parliament, the government shall be dismissed by own initiative and start activities to set a new Cabinet or the Prime Minister may address the Head of State to call for the ban on the parliament resolutions and to have a new election.

¹⁶ For last 28 years, only two of 15 governments in Mongolia could work for 4 years period while the others were dismissed before the appointed period.

the system of state structure. As a state organization, which is susceptible to corruption and creates a privilege to a group of people, have already been organized, positions of power may deteriorate the position under the name of improving the state institution.

In 2017, Mongolian People's Party (MPP) made a proposal of amendments to the Constitution. In our research, we paid an attention only to the section of state structure and political system of the proposal. Version of amendments into the "Constitution of Mongolia" proposed by MPP includes:

1. Changes in rights and responsibilities of President:

- To reduce Presidential power of initiating a law
- To deduct Presidential power of providing directions to the government

2. Amendments to Parliament:

- During the negotiation and approval of the budget, Parliament shall be prohibited to create a new type of costs or to increase the size of costs without prior proposals and opinions of the Government.
- Parliament session period should be 75 days. The attendance rate of the session and law approval rate should be increased.
- Within the framework of parliamentary power, ad hoc committee of inspection should be established.
- State Inspection organization with the assignments of assistances to parliament should be established.
- No more than one third of cabinet members should be a parliament member.

3. Changes related to the Government:

- Prime Minister shall organize his cabinet.
- Amendment of dismissal of the cabinet.
- State officials' principles of specialized, sustainable conditions and merit system of office shall be followed.

The version of constitutional amendments proposed by MPP reduced Presidential power of initiating law drafts and his/her involvement in government actions; however, it has reserved a "mixed" semi-parliament system with directly elected president. In the proposal, the Presidential power in jurisdiction is changed with ratification power of court appointments which in fact may reduce his/her influence over judiciary system though not completely denying his/her involvement.

The version of constitutional amendments by MPP decides to keep unicameral version which leads to restore the MPs' irresponsible, unethical behavior, degradation of knowledge and skills and reserve an incapability to restrict laws that serve for limited foreign and domestic groups against national interests.

While there is some slight progress in the MPP version of constitutional amendment as well as transferring government into a cabinet system, current system is going to be reserved at all.

Provisions of "Supreme Law" proposed jointly by Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), Mongolian Green Party (MGP), Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), and Civil Will-Green Party (CWGP) that intended to make amendments and changes to the Constitution are as following:

- To elect National Great Khuraldai (NGK);
- National Great Khuraldaishall enjoy a legislative power consists of elected and appointed representatives. Every administrative unit (of khoroo, village, and soum) will have its representative in NGK which consists of approximately 500 delegates.
- A person who collects no less than 250 supporting signs shall be nominated in National Great Khuraldai.
- One fourth of National Great Khuraldai total delegates shall be elected annually.

- To elect State Baga Khuraldai;
- Members of State Baga Khuraldai shall be elected by proportional system.
- President shall enjoy a right to disseminate State Baga Khuraldai upon negotiations with the Speaker of National Great Khuraldai and State Baga Khuraldai, and make a decree to announce a new election once in his full power period (Such a decree to disseminate State Baga Khuraldaimust not be made in the first year after the election for State Baga Khuraldai);
- National Great Khuraldaishall resolve whether to withdraw members of State Baga Khuraldai.

- To organize national referendum;
- Strategically important properties of peoples – to be resolved by public poll organized by National Great Khuraldai
- Local properties of peoples – to be resolved by public poll organized by Citizens Representatives' Khural.

- National Committee for Human Rights
- Public Inspection Committee

A version of “Supreme Law” is not interfering the presidential power but tends to increase them. It can be considered as a version of presidential system. In this circumstance, President can influence on all of legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The version of Supreme law proposes a bicameral parliament to improve the parties’ and parliament members’ responsibilities, and set restrictions to laws through the House of Representatives that might become a background to improve the quality of any legal documents. Role of the Prime Minister has decreased and several rights should be transmitted to the President.

Specific features of Presidential and Parliamentary system

According to the public opinion survey on preference of presidential and parliamentary systems, the result shows the increase of public support for presidential governance in Mongolia.

There is a clear difference between presidential and parliamentary system. In presidential system, a clear boundaries divide the structure and function of legislative and executive organs, whereas, less efficient and loose legislatures might also be harmful to democracy. In presidential system, the most attentive issue is an efficient collaboration of legislatures and executives, whereas parliamentary system finds difficult to keep autonomy of each branch of power.

Parliamentary democracy ensures interdependence of legislative and executive branches. The important factor for existence of this system is a trust relationship of the cabinet and majority of the parliament. Prime minister and his cabinet members should always keep gaining a trust of majority of the parliament. If parliament shows its’ loss of faith to Prime minister and his cabinet members, the cabinet needs to be resigned. On the other hand, in most cases a prime minister has a right to dismiss the parliament and to appoint a new election. These two types of mandate, as of parliament majority right for cabinet dismissal and presidential power for parliament dissemination grants interdependence of legislative and executive branches. Such arrangement prompts both to make commitments of consensus and consideration of majority votes of MPs. If the position of the president is controlled by political party, the legislature cannot be controlled by them. While in a presidential system, the power is divided between parliament and government, on the contrary, cabinet is appointed by majority of parliament or consists of mainly by parliamentarians in a parliamentary system. As a result, conflicts of legislatures and executives tend to be reduced and decision making

process goes much smoothly and effectively. Since the winning party in election controls both the legislature and executive branch, the cabinet plays a leading role in determining state policy, where the legislature is less influential in comparison with presidential regime. In parliamentary regime, political career of prime ministers are less granted or unreliable. Unlike the presidential government, prime ministers may resign from his/her post in any circumstances with any reason by parliamentary majority. It can be done in two ways. One is to approve a proposal of the parliament that does not trust the prime minister. The other is to reject the parliamentary proposal to convince the prime minister. Parliament minority usually initiates the offer of faith with the purpose of removal of prime minister. On the contrary, the prime minister proposes to counter this where there is no guarantee that the parliament will support it or not.

In a presidential system, where the legislature is in the control of opposing party of the president, the parliamentary control is not only rigid, but the party competition can easily lead to hurdle. Therefore, opposing parties' role rests on strict control over executives while the ruling party members use their majority position and seek to protect their cabinet members to get rid of public criticism.

In a presidential system, the parliamentary right of exercising the impartiality of the presidency is an ultimate sanction against serious violation of constitution and other legal acts. Though, in a parliamentary system, the vote for impartiality of the prime minister simply represents a loss of political support, therefore, the possibility of conflict between the executives and legislatures are rare to happen. Some parliaments allow voting for some ministers of the cabinet, not to prejudice the whole composition of the government.

CONCLUSION

All political parties seem to have an interest of making some amendments or entire change in Constitution, though; they have different perspectives on change. The MPP and DP, the dominant political parties that play major role in Mongolian politics, are interested in limiting amendments to the Constitution and willing to maintain unicameral parliamentary system. Certainly there are some different interests and positions among the members of these parties; however, both party leaders and majority of the members support this position. Minor parties that considered as a "third force" is interested in making an entire change in the constitution, however, their position on constitutional amendments are not integrated yet. For instance, while they support bicameral legislatures, they have conflicting positions over presidential and parliamentary system preferences. As well as, most parties encourage the idea of increasing power of executives, all cannot consolidate on limiting presidential power.

Товч агуулга: Уг өгүүлэлд Монголын парламентын засаглалын тогтолцоонд шинжилгээ хийсэн товч дүгнэлт, улс төрийн намуудын “Үндсэн хууль”-ийн хэлэлцүүлгээр дамжуулан засаглалын тогтолцооны талаар дэвшүүлсэн хувилбаруудад хийсэн шинжилгээний товч танилцуулга, энэ талаарх олон нийтийн санаа бодлын хандлага, парламентын болон ерөнхийлөгчийн засаглалын давуу болон сул талуудыг онол, практикийн үүднээс товч тайлбарлах зорилго тавьсан.

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