Speech Act Theory: Theoretical Frameworks and its Applications

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Abstract: *This paper examines the theoretical foundations of speech act theory and explores its potential applications in social contexts. The study systematically analyzes various classifications of speech act theories, focusing on the conventionalist approach developed by Austin, the mixed approach refined by Searle, and the intentionalist critique offered by Strawson. By examining the distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, along with felicity conditions, constitutive rules, and the role of intention in communication, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of how speech acts function in linguistic and social interactions. The analysis reveals that while these theoretical approaches differ in their emphasis on convention versus intention, they collectively contribute to our understanding of how language performs actions beyond mere description. This foundational analysis establishes a theoretical basis for future applications of speech act theory in addressing social issues.*

Keyword: Speech act theory; illocutionary force; felicity conditions; conventionalism; intentionalism; Austin; Searle; Strawson; linguistic philosophy; performative utterances

My aim in this paper is to examine the general framework of speech act theory and explore how this theoretical approach can serve as an analytical tool. This paper provides a systematic overview of various perspectives on speech act theory, highlighting their conceptual differences and theoretical foundations. By summarizing these diverse approaches, I offer a concise understanding of the current theoretical landscape, which is essential for exploring how the mechanisms of speech acts can be applied as methodological instruments in analyzing social phenomena and communication practices. To examine the variations on speech act accounts more accurately, I survey three different ways one may classify speech act theories:

a) Robert M. Harnish (2009) proposes two dimensions for categorizing speech act theories to analyze the impact of internal and external factors within speech act theories. First, he locates authors on the internalist-externalist spectrum based on their tendency to emphasize interlocutors' psychological states. Second, Harnish divides authors considering their analysis of illocutionary acts characteristics and distinguishes between Convention-Rule-Norm, Intention-Inference and Mixed continuum. The reason for focusing on an illocutionary act is related to its function. According to Austin illocutionary act is "performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something" (Austin 1962, 99) and is what seems to be the performative element of our speech. For example, the utterance of "I hereby name this ship the HMS Elizabeth" could be the act of ship-naming, when said in the right place and at the right time. Harnish's classification can be seen in the following table, from which we can see the rough correlation between the two dimensions. (Harnish, 2009, pp. 11-12):

Iental state-based:	**Internalist**	**Mixed**	**Externalist**
	Grice (1968), Strawson (1964) Schiffer(1972), Holdcroft(1978), Alston (2000)	Austin(1962), Searle(1969, 1975), Bach and Harnish (1979), Searle and Vanderveken (1985)	Gazdar (1981)
Nature of illocutionary act based:	**Intention-Inference**	**Mixed**	**Convention-Rule-Norm**

	Grice Schiffer Holdcroft	Bach and Harnish Searle (1975) Searle and Vanderveken	Austin Searle (1969) Alston Gazdar

b) Kissine (2009) proposes the literalist/contextualist classification. This classification indicates how much an utterance's "literal meaning" is autonomous from nonlinguistic factors (which affects how illocutionary force is defined). Austin (1962), Alston (2000), Searle (1969, 1983), Searle and Vanderveken (1985), Strawson (1964), Bach and Harnish (1979) are literalists, while Kissine(2009), Recanati(1989) are contextualists.

c) Harris, Fogal and Moss (2018) categorizes theories of speech acts into five groups based on the nature of the illocutionary act. The main objective of this taxonomy is to define the logical area within which these various theories fit. Speech act theory proliferates as the family of theories focused on convention, intention, function, expression and norm. For example, Austin, Searle (1969), Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2015) holds the conventionalist account, whereas Grice, Strawson, Schiffer, Bach and Harnish are intentionalists. As a functionalist, Millikan (1998) believes proper functions can define speech acts, and speech acts can get their proper function through a similar process like natural selection. Harms and Skyrms, who applied replicator dynamics to the communication, also represent the function-based speech act account. Another view of speech acts is expressionism. This account holds what kind of state of mind is expressed as the fundamental criteria for differentiating illocutionary acts. Bar On (2013), Davis (1992, 2003), Green (2007), Millikan (1998), Pagin (2011), Rosential (1986), Scott-Phillips (2014), Turri (2011) are the speech act expressionists. The fifth family of theories is focused on normativity. For example, Williamson (2000) defended that speech act is an act in virtue of a particular norm. His normative account is built around the assertion. Another form of normative account claims that producing a speech act is primarily doing something that confers certain entitlements and obligations or commitments. Brandom (1983; 1994; 2000), MacFarlane (2011; 2014), Lance (2009) and Lance and Kukla (2008, 2013) are considered proponents of a normative account of speech acts. Even though Harris, Fogal and Moss offer five families of speech act theories, they noted that expression and function-based accounts are alternatives of intentionalism.

As we have seen, speech act theory diverged into other branches because of the different ideas about the nature of the illocutionary act. These separate accounts all aim to define illocutionary force and to describe the relationship between the force and meaning of an utterance, frequently considering the speaker and/or audience in the procedure. The convention and intention-based distinction is the primary spectrum in the three different (Harnish; Kissine; Harris, Fogal and Moss) taxonomy versions on speech act theories.

Therefore, in the following section, I will review the convention-based intention-based traditions. It is not an exhaustive examination of all of the authors mentioned in the preceding discussion. Instead, I focus on primary, pioneering contributors to the relevant literature to sketch out the core debate about a speech act, in which my arguments (which is related to pejoratives and slurs) will be situated. When I progress through these branches of the speech act theories, my main focus would be on the "illocutionary act".

Illocutionary acts are regarded as the essence of speech act theory.

1. **Austin's speech act framework (conventionalism)**:
Since Austin is the founder of speech act theory, I will make a concerted effort to cover all significant aspects of his work. The theory of speech acts is based on the presumption that the basic communication unit is specific acts such as making statements, requesting, apologizing, and thanking, not sentences or

other linguistic expressions. Philosphers of language are invariably familiar with Austin's *"How to Do Things with Words"*, published in 1962, which has launched the modern study of speech acts.

Constative and performative

Austin noted that several philosophical advancements during that time, such as verificationism and logical positivism, demonstrated that many utterances were not as easily interpretable as thought. As a result, many things that appeared to be meaningful turned out to be nonsense. However, according to Austin, there are numerous sensible, practical, and useful applications of language that cannot be adequately analyzed as to their truth value. For example, when one says

1) 'I am betting you sixpences that it will snow tomorrow.'

One does not merely convey true or false data about one's intention. In uttering (1), the speaker makes a bet, performing a particular act. "Performative"[35] speech is what Austin calls these types of utterances because they use speech to perform an action rather than just to tell (truth-relevant) information. By contrast, "constative" is a declarative or descriptive statement that could be either true or false. Constative utterances are thought to be those that are empirically verifiable. For example,

2) 'The cat is on the mat.'
3) 'The water boils at 100 Celsius.'

On a broad level, we can say that Austin's distinction of constative and performative utterances is founded on the recognition of saying something and doing something through the use of language, as it was initially conceived. Austin's key examples that he used to illustrate his main point have become classic quotations:

4) 'I do', as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony.
5) 'I name this ship the Elizabeth', said during the naming ceremony for a new ship
6) 'I bet...' said to someone before a race.

Unlike constative, performatives have an impact on reality through additional action, additional facts. "When I say, before the registrar or altar, 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it." (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 6). A new state of affairs comes into reality, and a new family is born at that particular moment. However, not every utterance is sufficient to constitute the performance of the action (of marrying, naming or betting, et cetera). Typically, a simple, everyday 'I do' accomplishes very little. These utterances must be said to the right person, at the right time, and under the appropriate circumstances. Unmarried guests cannot say 'I do' at a wedding and marry the bride. Someone cannot shout, 'I name this ship the Wittgenstein!' and in doing so, name the ship, nor can I (usually) bet on someone's behalf. In order to be successful, the act must be performed under proper circumstances. For example, a modern Mongolian citizen says to her husband, 'I hereby divorce you' does not constitute a divorce. The appropriate procedures should be followed to divorce, saying that utterance before the civil court makes a divorce take effect. Whereas in ancient China, if a man thinks that his wife violated the wife's virtue, he can exclaim 'I hereby divorce you' while hanging the divorce paper before the entire family is enough to constitute the divorce. Even if I am the designated person to name the ship, I must do so during the naming ceremony, and I cannot do so by simply saying those words during lunch. Similarly, after the race has ended, I am unable to place a wager.

It is evident from these examples that the following question will arise. What determines a person's, place's, or phrase's 'rightness'? Austin's answer is "the conventional procedure which by our purporting to use." (Austin, 1996, p. 122). We attempt to carry out some action whose execution is determined by our commitment to conventions whenever we speak. Of course, using commonly

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[35] Hornsby mentions that in recent literature, there are different usage of this term. First is "the speaker's possible illocutionary acts are brought under heads of performativity". Another usage is the more special sense, connected with the explicit performativity. (Hornsby, 2008, p. 906)

accepted conventions does not represent a mark of truth or falsehood. The utterance 'I bet sixpence it will rain tomorrow' could not be evaluated as truth-relevant, a report, or a description of a mental state I may have. While performative utterances may not be examined to determine whether they are true or false, they must meet certain criteria to affect the realization of the utterance. To achieve the desired effect, a performative must meet certain social and cultural standards. As a result, Austin developed a typology of conditions that performatives must satisfy. He coined the term "felicity conditions/happy" to refer to these circumstances. According to Austin, there are three different types of felicity conditions.

(A. I) The presence of "an accepted conventional procedure having a specific conventional effect."

(A. 2) The existence of "particular persons and circumstances."

(B. I) The correct and (B.2) complete execution of the procedure.

(Γ .1) When proper to the act, "having certain thoughts, feelings, and intentions" and (Γ .2) must actually conduct themselves subsequently. (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, pp. 14-15). To follow A.1-2, it is crucial to have the right conditions, people, and conventions in place. The speaker should completely and accurately perform the speech act to follow B.l-2 regulations. Utterances that satisfy felicity conditions are felicitous, while those who do not meet them are infelicitous.

The first kind of infelicity is "misfire", when a performative speech act is attempted but did not follow the conventional requirements of that action, and no act occurs. In other words, a misfire occurs when the A and B conditions requirements are unmet. For example, a judge declares, 'The accused is not guilty' during the dinner table is not a verdictive. The judge should announce the decision in an appropriate circumstance: at least at the court. The second kind of infelicity is the "abuse", in which the act is performed but in some other way is unhappy. It is a violation of the Γ condition. The Γ rules mandate a speaker's integrity and commitment.

A famous example would be thanking or congratulating someone while thinking that the addressee is not worthy of gratitude or praise. In these cases, the action has been performed according to its conventional requirements. However, "it fails to live up to a standard appropriate for speech acts of its kind." (Green, 2020) The difference between abuse and misfire is the speaker's implication. In the case of a misfire, circumstances may prevent the speaker from performing the speech act, whereas during abuse speaker is aware of his or her inability to perform the action.

For further analysis for the performatives, Austin seeks a grammatical (or lexicographical) criterion for differentiating performative from non-performative utterances. Thus, he focuses on 'explicit performative', an utterance that uses the first person's performative verb to indicate, or make clear, the action that the utterance is supposed to perform. An utterance such as 'I hereby appoint you to head of department' is such an explicit performative. Using the word hereby and the verb "appoint," it is clear what action is being performed: appointment making. Although many performative utterances do not take this form, they can be rephrased by adding a performative verb to make their performative purpose explicit. For example, "I will meet you at the dormitory" can be used as a promise, and Austin coined this type of performative as a 'primary' or implicit performative. These performatives might be more common in everyday speech, and the explicit performative has "evolved" from primary utterances. (Austin 1962, 33). Implicit performatives show that we can say performatives without "hereby" or operative verbs, and non-performative utterances can have operative words. From this observation, Austin was convinced that all constative were, in fact, primary or implicit performatives.

In addition, a significant conclusion drawn from the felicity condition is that the distinction between performatives and constative does not hold up to close theoretical scrutiny. The reason is that a dimension of felicity requires some degree of conformity to "facts." As Austin said, "considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)" (Austin, How to do

things with words, 1962, p. 55). Indeed, Austin highlights the fact that every regular utterance contains both effective and descriptive components: that saying something is also an act.

Because an interlocutor who utters a true or false statement is performing a description or statement, the constative can be considered a type of performative. Austin observed the four common aspects shared between performative and constative. These are:

1) "If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy, then the statement that I am apologizing is true.
2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain—those notably in Rules A. 1 and A. 2—must be true.
3) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain other conditions obtain—those notably in our rule [Г.l]— must be true.
4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example, contractual ones, then statement typically of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular thing are true." (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 53)

Since constative having felicity conditions, they are speech acts too. Thus, there are various types of speech acts, each with its own set of felicity conditions determined by convention and context and had little to do with truth conditions. Austin gave up his initial distinction between constative and performatives since it can be seen that constative are performatives.

Locution, Illocution, Perlocution

Austin redirected the discussion away from the performative-constative binary and offered more fine-grained distinctions based on three different "aspects" of an utterance. These are "locutionary", "illocutionary", and "perlocutionary" acts and each will be considered in turn.

These acts are three critical components of a speech act. The relation between these acts is similar to the Russian Matryoshka doll. Locution is included in illocution, and illocution is in perlocution since three acts can be performed simultaneously. However, all speech acts not necessarily should be perlocutionary. The Matryoshka doll metaphor can be shown with the following example: 'Could you pass the salt, please?' The utterance's apparent side and the locutionary act are both a question with explicit content (Pass the salt). The request from the speaker's part was conveyed in the illocutionary act. The perlocutionary act expresses the speaker's intention to addressee past the salt. Now let's look into the first type of act: locutionary acts.

According to Austin (1965), a ***locutionary act*** occurs when the speaker utters words or says something correctly to convey meaning, sense, and reference. Even though, the precise definition of sense and reference is missing from "How to do things with words", we can see that Austin's usage of sense and reference lies within the Fregean framework. In this case, phonetics and grammar are critical. A locutionary act, which includes phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts, corresponds to any meaningful utterance's verbal, syntactic, and semantic components. It can be said that the locutionary act is the "sum of the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts".

a) A phonetic act-"To perform the act of uttering certain noises".
b) A phatic act-"To perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words ."
c) A rhetic act-"To perform the act of using that sentence or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference'(which together are equivalent to 'meaning')" (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, pp. 92-93).

For instance, "She said 'I promise I will give you five dollars" reports a phatic act, whereas "She meant that she would give someone five dollars" reports a rhetic act. In phatic acts, the meaning of the utterance is not involved while performing it, while for a rhetic act, one should need to know what the sentence means.

Illocutionary acts are regarded as the essence of speech act theory. The reason is that "The notion of 'illocution' accounts for what one does, thereby enshrining the action potential of our utterances." (Caponetto, 2017, p. 3) The primary way to recognize illocution from other types of acts is an illocutionary force. Austin said, "I shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces'. (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 100)." Austin reuses the term force from Frege, who differentiated the sentence's expression of thought from the "assertoric force", which a speaker uses the sentence when he pronounces his evaluation that the thought is true (Frege, 1995). Unlike Frege, Austin extends the application of force to all illocutionary-level uses. It is the illocutionary force that determines what performative act as been performed. Besides, if we think about the felicity condition of the performative, we can infer that illocutionary force depends on the conventions governing the speech situation.

The relation between utterances and illocutionary acts is an interesting question to tackle. For instance, I request my sister to wash the dishes by uttering, "Do the dishes please!". What is the difference between this illocutionary act and utterance? If the utterance is the action of saying or expressing something aloud, it could correspond to the locutionary act. When the utterance of a sentence is performed in the right situation, it can be an illocutionary act. Thus, we can say that utterance is token-identical with an illocutionary act. "Do the dishes please!" It can be described as the utterance of a sentence like "Bujee says, "Do the dishes please!" or described as illocutionary acts like "Bujee requests her sister to do the dishes".

The main difference between locution and illocution is that the former refers to the sense and reference of the utterance. The latter refers to the actions constituted by the utterance—which speech act (if any) is performed when it is uttered. From here, we can see that "Austin's original distinction between performative and constative utterances turns into a distinction between force and content as aspects of a single utterance." (Lycan, 2000, p. 148)

Austin classified five different types of speech acts based on illocutionary force: (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. Lecture XII):

1. "Verdictives: are kinds of judgment or verdict by a jury, arbitrator or umpire, executives using rights or authority exercising power and for example, diagnosing, measuring, describing etc.

2. Exercitives: are kinds of giving a decision in favor of or against a specific course of action. This class involves appointing, demoting, naming etc.

3. Commissives: It means committing someone for a particular course of action. It includes promising, intending, undertaking etc.

4. Behabitives: reaction toward the behavior, fortunes, or attitudes of others, like apologize, congratulate, welcome, etc.

5. Expositives: acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and clarifying. For example, affirming, reporting, remarking, etc."

Harnish criticized this classification as "not coherent, principled taxonomy of illocutionary acts based on their nature." (Harnish, 2009, p. 14) Indeed, Austin compares each class with the other ones, points out the overlaps, and mentions "mixed" cases. He did not categorize illocutionary acts but rather performative verbs. Thus, this classification seems to intend to provide a broad overview of illocutionary acts: the various illocutionary acts that can be performed when uttering a sentence.

Besides, Cohen (1964) argues that the distinction between locution and illocution collapses. Once a performative utterance is phrased in the explicit sense— "Retreat!" becomes "I command that you retreat" –the supposed illocutionary force collapses into the meaning of the sentence (Cohen, 1964, p. 121). According to Cohen, to say 'I command that you retreat' is just ordering a retreat, and the meaning of the utterance is that it contains a retreat. In other words, we don't need an extra-semantic

notion to guarantee force because meaning already does so. As long as illocutionary force can be captured so easily by its content, it does not appear that it should be considered a distinct concept from the utterance and its content. In addition, Strawson examines Austin's use of locutionary meaning by differentiating three dimensions of meaning (A-meaning (linguistic), B-meaning (linguistic-cum-referential), C-meaning (complete)) and reveals difficulties in consistently interpreting Austin's terminology. (Strawson P. F., 1997, p. 191) Hornsby also suggested that "we might employ Austin's word 'locutionary' not to name any sort of speech act, but instead to mark that portion of a description of the use of language which is concerned to relate phatic acts with rhetic acts" (Hornsby, 2008, p. 895). The general argument drawn from these criticisms is that the distinction between locution and illocution, which is supposed to characterize performative utterances, does not play a significant explanatory role in the analysis.

But we can get an example that illustrates that locution and illocution do not collapse in all performative utterances. For instance, when we say goodbye in Mongolian, we say "bayartai", which means joy. During our Mongolian language session in high school, our class look into the etymology of the "bayartai". The original version of "bayartai" was the "see you again with a joy" yet shortened as with joy. Thus, our class discussed that "bayartai" diverged from its original meaning and seemed like imply we are happy to part. So, we thought up a new version of saying goodbye to our class. It was "sanatai", which means "miss you". As a result, we spoke to each other "Miss you" instead of "Goodbye" for the whole school year. In this context, the right person correctly uttering the right words constitutes farewell. The original meaning of miss you have its meaning, but nowhere in the meaning of those words can we find anything to do with a farewell. Thanks to our discussion, my classmates performed the action farewell, which is distinct from the actual meaning of the miss you.

The ***perlocutionary act*** refers to the effects or consequences of an utterance. These include shifts in other people's beliefs or behaviours. For instance, by persuading someone to give a discount for selling his car, one may get a discount which is the effect of the perlocutionary act. The perlocutionary result is a sequence of illocutionary acts. The causal effects of uttering things are in this way distinguished from the illocutionary force. For example, what convinces me may not convince you, but what counts as recognizing a promise holds for both of us. Let me illustrate this with an example:

7) I warn you not to go out at night.

8) I prohibit you not to go out at night.

Even though the first sentence has some effect, whether the students go out at night is their decision. It just gains the effect that students will consider after hearing my warning. But the second sentence means the students cannot go out at night, and it gains the consequence of the hearer.

However, illocutionary acts frequently require the acquisition of specific recognition or effects to be performed successfully. For example, I can warn students not to go out at night, and they did not hear me, or I was joking. It would be difficult to say that my utterance is successful unless the hearer recognizes it. In other words, successful illocutionary acts must secure uptake, "taking effect and inviting response" (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 120). Securing uptake involves the speaker's effort to "make the force and meaning of the utterance available to the audience" (Sbisà, 2013). The notion of uptake, the securing of recognition seems to be a causal effect of the utterance. Thus, the question of the main difference between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act arises again.

Bach answered this question in the following manner.

A speech act has "two levels of success: considered merely as an illocutionary act, a request (for example) succeeds if your audience recognizes your desire that they do a certain thing, but as a perlocutionary act, it succeeds only if they actually do it." (Bach, 2006, p. 151) In other words, when uptake is secured, as a result of conventional effect then the illocutionary act will be performed.

"Illocutionary effect" is not related to "natural course of events" (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 116), rather than that it involves our conventions, rule-following behaviors, choices, agreements. Austin commits firmly to the significance of uptake for illocutionary force (Austin, How to do things with words, 1962, p. 116) and conformity of convention. Perlocutionary force is idiosyncratic and not responsive to conventional requirements. "[Perlocutionary] effect is achieved by the force and meaning of an utterance is wholly outside the control of the speaker, and also outside the control of the meaning of his words" (Grünberg 2014, 14). In contrast to perlocutionary acts, illocutionary acts can be coherently and comprehensively studied with the tools for linguistic analysis. complete and valid

2. Searle's Speech Act Theory (conventionalism or mixed)

According to a different taxonomy of speech act theory, Searle is representative of various accounts. When it comes to the autonomy of literal meaning, he is a literalist. But when it comes to the nature of illocutionary acts, he is either conventionalist or mixed depending on his evolution of thought. Furthermore, it can be said that "Searle's (1969) combination of conventions and intentions in the conditions for the performance of speech acts turn his proposal into one of the most 'mixed' cases in Harnish's categorization." (Navarro-Reyes, 2010).

Searle has modified and diverged from Austin's original version and contains several vital additions to speech act theory. For example, Searle criticizes the distinction between phonetic, phatic, rhetic acts and claims that rhetic act is a version of illocution. Also, he did not accept the locutionary act label. The reason is that one cannot perform a locutionary act without also performing an illocutionary act. Also, meaning "is also at least sometimes a matter of convention", it seems like locution does not play an important role. (Searle, 1969, p. 45). Thus, he presents a new term, the propositional act, which refers to and predicates, alongside utterance act, which refers to uttering words (morphemes, sentences) (Searle, 1969, p. 23). It seems like Austin's phonetic and phatic acts evolved into utterance act while rhetic act has been renamed propositional act. The utterance act can be both a propositional act and an illocutionary act. Utterance act refers to uttering strings of words, while utterance of words under specific conditions with specific intentions are referred to as a propositional or illocutionary act. The propositional act should be performed with the illocutionary act idiosyncratically (Searle, 1969, p. 25). "The suggestion is that no utterance of speech action will be force neutral" (Grünberg, 2014, p. 4).

Furthermore, the distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content[36] is drawn within the structure of the illocutionary act. Speech act formally represented as the "F(p)" where "F" is the force component, and "p" stands for the propositional content of the utterance. The variation of the illocutionary act can illustrate this distinction. For instance, asking "Did Searle travel to Asia?" has the same propositional content as asserting "Searle travelled to Asia." The difference lies in illocutionary force.

On the other hand, two illocutionary acts can have the same illocutionary force but differ in propositional contents. Asserting that "Two plus two equals four." has the same force as asserting "It is raining." Thus, performing a speech act entails generating propositional content coupled with illocutionary force.

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[36] Here, I would like to address is the difference between "propositional content" and "semantic content." The propositional content is the property of an illocutionary act, while semantic content is a property of a sentence. For instance, the proposition that "I advise you to stop smoking" can be the propositional content of advising to quit the smoking, but not the semantic content of "He advised her to stop smoke".

"Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of behaviour" and that in some ways, the meanings of utterances are governed by these kinds of rules (Searle, 1969, p. 12). It can be said that the rules are inter-translatable and have different manifestations of the same underlying principles. Any language would be an actualization of these underlying constitutive rules. As a result, linguistic behaviour is governed by the linguistic conventions of language. Thus, the linguistic conventions govern illocutionary acts.

He classified rules of speech act into two groups: regulative rules and constitutive rules.

Regulative rules govern acts that exist before and separately, such as etiquettes and traffic regulations. Regulative rules can be 'paraphrased' as imperatives, having the form of "Do X" or "If Y do X". For example, if you visit someone's house, notify them beforehand.

Constitutive rules "create or define new forms of behaviour." (Searle, 1969, p. 33) such as football or chess rules. In the 'chess' game, constitutive rules constitute or make up the game of chess that is the existence of the game becomes impossible without these constitutive rules. Constitutive rules have the conceptual form "X counts as Y in context C" (Searle, 1969, pp. 33-34). For example, while moving one square is legal for the King, it is not for the Knight. Specific speech acts are carried out in virtue of conventions that are realizations of underlying constitutive rules. In other words, to perform a speech act is to obey specific constitutive rules.

As mentioned in the previous section, Austin proposed felicity conditions involving the speaker's sincerity and various facts about the context, which must be met to explain illocutionary acts of one kind or another. Then according to Searle, felicity conditions are more than indicators on which utterances can fail; they are also jointly constitutive of the multiple illocutionary forces. Searle (1969, 1975) proposed categorizing felicity conditions based on their specialization: propositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and the essential condition.

Propositional content: concerned with what the speech act is about (the reference of the utterance). For example, the content of the warning would relate to the future event.

Preparatory condition: the prerequisites for the speech act. They pertain to the interlocutor's background circumstances and knowledge that must exist before the act's performance. This condition is necessary for the non-defective and successful illocutionary act. The social status of the interlocutors is one feature of this condition. As in, when ordering something, the speaker must hold the proper position to order the addressee. Also, the speaker should believe that hearer can do that action, and unless the speaker does, the ordered addressee will not do that action by their own will.

Sincerity condition: is about the speaker's intention, belief and desire. The psychological state of the speaker is frequently required for illocutionary acts to take place. If the act is to be performed sincerely, this condition should be met (if it is not met, it is still performed, but there is abuse.) For instance, when warning, the speaker firmly believes the addressee does not interested in the event.

Essential condition: is connected to an act's illocutionary force, or "what the utterance counts as." (Searle, 1969, p. 48) It contains the commitment made to perform a particular speech act. In other words, it is the speaker's intention that his utterance will account for the specific act and that the hearer recognizes this intention. In this case, the warning would be counted as an undertaking that event is not in the target's best interest. The one feature that should be mentioned in the essential rule is the illocutionary force indicating device. Bach said that force-indicating devices are the components of "constitutive rules", explaining illocutionary force (Bach, 2006, p. 149).

Illocutions have illocutionary force indicators and propositional indicators. These two distinct types of syntactical elements make different contributions to the illocutionary act. Illocutionary force indicators (Searle 1969, 30) explicitly show how the propositional content of an utterance should be taken. On the other hand, propositional indicators play a part in the propositional content of an utterance

through their presence. For instance, when I utter "I advise you to stop smoking", the propositional indicator "you to stop smoking" refers to the propositional content of the utterance. In contrast, the force indicator "I advise" shows that this is advice. "The illocutionary force indicating devices are the word order, stress, intonation, contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and so-called performative verbs" (Searle 1969, 30). It seems that illocutionary force is encoded and gives cues to the speaker's intention.

From the classification of the felicity conditions, we can see that preparatory and sincerity rules emphasize the speaker's cognitive state, mainly his intentions. From here, Searle's analysis is shifted to an intentional or mentalist view, which holds that the speaker's intentions – and their recognition – are necessary for the realization of a speech act in contrast to Austin, who maintains that an act cannot be performed by appealing to intention.

The classification of the illocutionary act was refined with his collaboration with Vanderveken (1985). They offer seven features of the illocutionary force. Six features are different conditions required for felicitous utterance, while the seventh is the "illocutionary point". According to them, the illocutionary point is "that purpose which is essential to a given illocutionary act's being an act of that type" (Searle & Vanderveken, 1985, p. 14). In short, from an illocutionary point, we can see the essence of the utterance's conversational function. For example, speech acts of suggesting and advising both have the illocutionary point of the directive. The remaining six features of the illocutionary force determine what constitutes that specific illocutionary act. These are:

- **Strength of the illocutionary point** distinguishes between distinct types of illocutionary acts that make the same point but have varying degrees of strength. For instance, requesting someone to do something is weaker than insisting that he does it, although both aim to commit someone to do action.
- **Mode of achievement** specifies how the illocutionary point must be made. An excellent example of this is testifying. Unlike making an assertion, one can testify only if the mode of achievement is satisfied, i.e., he has the position of a witness.
- **Degree of strength of sincerity conditions** differentiates the strength of mental states expressed by illocutionary acts. For instance, sincerely imploring requires a stronger desire than sincerely requesting.
- **Propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions and sincerity conditions** are explained previously.

Searle and Vanderveken offer a five-category taxonomy of these illocutionary points, which they support with 'direction of fit'. This illocutionary act feature is related to its propositional content, which may or may not correspond to how the world is. Going back to Austin, "direction-of-fit accounts of the performative–constative distinction offer a different perspective on why performatives are often seen as incapable of truth or falsity." (Szabó & Thomason, 2019, p. 223)

Both illocutionary points and direction of fit used for the taxonomy of the speech act:

The direction of fit definitions from (Searle & Vanderveken, 1985, pp. 53-54)

Direction of fit	Illocutionary point
Word-to-world: In achieving success of fit, the propositional content of the Illocution fits and independently existing state of affairs in the world.	Assertive
World-to word: In achieving success of fit, the word is altered to fit the propositional content of the Illocution.	Directives
	Commissive
The double direction of fit: In achieving success of fit, the world is altered to fit the propositional content by representing the world as being so altered.	Declarative

Null or empty: There is no question of achieving success of fit between the propositional content and the world because, in general, the success of fit is presupposed by the utterance.	Expressive

In *Expression and Meaning* (1979), Searle updates the classification and offers twelve criteria that must be met to perform a speech act. He pointed out the following three as the most important dimensions for his taxonomy of speech act from these twelve criteria.

1. The point of the act which corresponds to the essential condition
2. Direction of fit.
3. Expressed psychological state which corresponds to the sincerity conditions.

From the remaining dimensions, four of them coincides with Searle's previous criteria: a) strength of the the illocutionary point, b) preparatory conditions are updated as to status of the participants and related to interest of participants, c) propositional content which is determined by the illocutionary force indicating the device. Additional dimensions are:

a) **relations to the rest of the discourse:** whether speech act serves as link between rest of the discourse or not;

b) **non-linguistic performability:** whether an act can be performed without speech or not;

c) **dependence on the extra-linguistic institutions:** whether speech act requires the special position of the interlocutors or not;

d) **possibility of using performative verbs:** whether illocution has performative verb or not:

e) **style:** having distinct marks to serve as pointing which illocutionary the act has been performed.

Indirect speech act

Searle notices that when one makes an utterance, it can mean something other than a literal meaning. He predicted the possible different interpretations of the indirect speech acts, which he defined as "cases in which one illocutionary act performed indirectly by way of performing another." (Searle, 1996, p. 168). According to Searle, an indirect speech act consists of two distinct speech acts, each with its illocutionary point. For example, if I ask "Can you pass the salt?", it can be understood as a literal question about the hearer's ability. However, in this case, the indirect act which requesting someone to pass the salt to me is more dominant and considered as a primary act. The literal illocutionary point conveys both a literal and an intended illocutionary point. In indirect speech act, the intended illocutionary point includes literal meaning but extends beyond it. He examines instances in which the speaker completes a sentence and means something other than what the linguistic conventions specify. Consider the simple utterance 'I am hungry.' If the speaker intends to convey his current feelings, this is considered direct language. If, however, he wishes to request the hearer to cook something or ask him to go out to eat, this utterance would be indirect. With this sentence, he performs simultaneously statement and request- two different illocutionary acts.

Searle draws a distinction between conventional and non-conventional indirect speech acts. The former category includes illocutionary acts that are frequently and consistently used to generate indirect speech acts. The latter category's members, non-conventional indirect speech acts, depend much more on mutually shared background information and the context in which the utterance is produced. To explain this phenomenon, Searle appeals to general speech act theory and Grice's cooperative principles, speaker and hearer's background information, and the hearer's ability to make an inference (Searle, 1996). An indirect speech act is the one reason why Searle's account is considered a mixed version, mixing conventionalism and intentionalism. If the speaker performs a speech act, he uses means accepted by the community beforehand because commonly shared awareness and understanding ensure that such behaviour "counts as" an expression of a particular state. Searle's analysis combines conventional and intentional dimensions in the sense that what must be manifested to perform a speech act is no longer a specific procedure but a certain cognitive content (the intention). Thus the speech act

no longer implies a change in the world; instead, it means a shift in how the audience interprets the speaker's intentions.

3. **Strawson's criticism of conventionalism (intentionalism)**

Strawson (1964) reinterpreted key elements of Austin's account to create a new, intention-oriented variant of speech act theory. He argues that, in general, we cannot say all illocutionary acts are conventional. First, and clearly, in performing various rituals and in rendering verdicts in games and courts, various social conventions are relied upon. For example, saying "I do" during a wedding ceremony behind the altar is "… in part constituted by what we easily recognize as established conventions of procedure in addition to the conventions governing the meanings of our utterances." (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 443). These conventional speech acts are usually performed in the context of an institution. Even granting that the force of many utterances is governed by convention, Strawson believes it is quite clear that many illocutionary acts are not conventional in this sense. For example, saying "The tea is hot. Careful!" with the force of a warning is not to be involved with any conventions other than those linguistic conventions which fix the meaning of the sentence. Strawson accepted Austin's central doctrine of illocutionary forces, which depends on distinguishing the force aspect of speech act from the sense and reference element so that one utterance could have a variety of different forces.

Strawson used two additional examples for arguing that not all illocutionary acts are conventional. The first is the case of entreaty. Strawson argues that even though many complexities might be brought out when determining what makes a particular utterance an entreaty, and even if there are conventional ways one may make an entreaty, there is nothing which makes it necessary that every entreaty be conventional. For example, "Don't go!" uttered with the proper intentions in the appropriate situation, etc., will count as an entreaty rather than an order or a request, even without special conventions fixing it as such. (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 444). We can argue that there may be conventions that govern things like intonation and tone of voice, making one tone appropriate for objection, another for warning, etc. Strawson did not address this issue. However, as we know, Searle takes note of those features and calls them illocutionary force indicating devices.

The second case is objection. Strawson proposes that what makes a particular utterance an objection, say in a philosophical dispute, may have nothing to do with conventions other than those that fix the meanings of the utterances involved. So, in the most straightforward sort of case of arguing, in which philosopher X says "P" and philosopher Y says "not P" during a public conversation, "not P" would count as an objection. The illocutionary act would be objecting, and Strawson maintains that there are no special conventions that would determine this. These two cases are tied mainly in Strawson's goal to introducing an analysis of an intentional mechanism in the performance of illocutionary acts. The basis of Strawson's interpretation of Austin is found in Austin's claim that the use of a sentence "…may be said to be conventional in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula." (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 440) Strawson's central interpretation could be summarized in the following three steps:

1. We can make explicit the force with which an utterance is issued by rendering the force explicit in a performative formula.
2. Explicit performative formula makes clear how utterances are intended to be taken.
3. Intentions to secure certain kinds of uptake are essential to illocutionary acts.

From here, we can say that Strawson contends that what is made explicit in such situations are the speaker's intentions. Thus, he incorporates Grice (1957) into his account of the illocutionary act. In performing an utterance, the speaker intends to elicit a specific response from the hearer "by means of recognition on the part of the audience the intention to produce that response, this recognition to serve

as part of the reason that the audience has for its response, and the intention that this recognition should occur being itself intended to be recognized" (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 450).

The influence of Grice's work on speech act theory can be highlighted via the following quotation. "After Grice it was not as interesting whether or not marriage is infelicitous if the groom doesn't kiss the bride. What is interesting is how communicating with language works when illocutionary acts are involved; how we explain facts of language use, not just describe them." (Harnish, 2009, p. 15) Thus, before we go any further, first, let us take a quick look at Grice's account on meaning.

"Grice regards meaning as something that agents create by their communicating actions, and that is rooted in their intentions and beliefs. He offers an analysis of speaker meaning that characterizes it as a peculiar sort of communicative intention." (Szabó & Thomason, 2019, p. 159) Grice's analysis of the meaning of the terms "means," "means something," and "means that" reveals a multiple classification of meaning. In some instances, these phrases can be used to convey natural meaning, while in others, they can convey unnatural meaning (meaningNN). The form of natural meaning can be like "…x meant that p and x means that p entail p." (Grice, Meaning 1957, 377). The natural meaning is agent independent, non-linguistic, fact-involved meaning. The reason that natural meaning does not involve acts of intentional communication. Whereas non-natural meaning refers to the type of meaning at play in statements such as "The raising hand means I have a question". There is a distinction between meaningNN of a specific utterance and meaningNN of a sentence (type). The meaningNN of the sentence type is timeless and involves a linguistic convention, based on regularities of speaker meaning, while meaningNN of a specific utterance is, according to Grice, the (conceptually) more fundamental of the two, and can be defined in terms of the psychological state of the speaker.

Grice builds his account in three stages. In a first try he introduces an intention: ""x meantNN something" would be true if x was intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some "audience" and that to say what the belief was would be to say what x meantNN." (Grice, 1957, p. 381). For example, if a boyfriend posted picture of a ring in his Facebook account, people would assume that he will propose to his girlfriend. But posting picture of a ring does not meanNN that he is about to propose. This account tends to exclude the intention and look over the in particular occasion what speaker may mean. In second attempt, he proposes that additional to intention, speaker requires to intend hearer to recognize the speaker's intention to induce a belief in the hearer. For instance, I can leave the flower vase my sister has broken as it is to my mom to see. But it does not mean my mom will get it my intention. It cannot be the case of the meaningNN. In second try, Grice concludes that a speaker must have following three intentions: a) that an audience will come to believe that p, and b) that this audience will recognize intention "a", and c) that the recognition in "b" will cause the belief in "a". The meaningNN of the sentence can thus also be defined in terms of the meaningNN of individual utterance. For instance, when I say "It is cold," I intend to create in my audience the belief that it is cold by causing the hearer to recognize my intention through the use of that sentence (which has a specific meaning). Usually, when we say it is cold we intend to characterize the current situation. However, I may intend to hearer to close the window. Then what I mean is not expressed in the meaning of the sentence "It is cold" and cannot be reduced to it. The hearer needs to recognize it from what I say. This recognition is possible with the taking account of the context of the utterance. The hearer's recognition would cause the belief in what I intended to say. Searle (1969) points out a problem with such an account. According to Searle, the meaning of the words is now merely another piece of contextual information. He views this as problematic, insisting that speaker meaning and word meaning should be distinguished. Searle demonstrates his point by constructing the following example: an American soldier (A) attempts to get an Italian soldier (I) to think that he (A) is a German soldier. To do this, A speaks the only German sentence he knows (poem), hoping that B does not know enough German to understand what exactly A is saying. A's intention is to convey "I am a German soldier", but this intention should not be understood

to erase the conventional meaning of the words (the poem's meaning is different in German). However, Searle acknowledges that this issue can be resolved by allowing for the intention of conventional use. That is, convention can be incorporated into a Gricean account by considering the speaker's conventional use of a word to be one of the intentions he wishes to convey to the listener (and therefore one of the conditions that the hearer must recognize or infer).

Strawson acknowledges that some illocutionary acts employ specific linguistic and cultural conventions, but he emphasizes that Gricean inference is still required for interpretation in these instances. The speaker must communicate his intention to invoke the convention, and the hearer must be familiar with the convention and understand the speaker's intent. Regardless of convention usage, it is the speaker's responsibility to make his intentions overt. (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 458). In short, "Austin's illocutionary acts can (at least for those cases that do not depend on the following of conventions), be explicated as cases of Gricean speaker meaning." (Sbisà, 2013) Then, to get the speaker meaning hearer should understand the literal meaning and the speaker should intend to hearer to recognize his utterance.

Furthermore, Strawson is arguing that securing uptake is connected with making one's communicative intentions clear. Then the question would be how the securing of uptake is associated with the illocutionary force of the utterance. As we discussed before, securing uptake is different from accomplishing further things because of the success in securing uptake. This is the reason why illocutionary acts can be distinguished from perlocutionary acts. The connection that Strawson sees between making one's communicative intentions clear is that speakers could use conventional means for making their intentions clear when such conventional means are available. What conventions are there for making our intentions to perform in illocutionary acts manifest? It seems like there are at least two sorts of cases.

First, there are cases in which there exist conventions associated with procedures and rituals which determine illocutionary acts to be what they are. Second, there are cases in which the conventions that fix the meanings of sentences also clarify the illocutionary act performed with such sentences. The second kind of case is highly important in connecting convention with the idea of an explicit performative formula. Strawson argues that one conventional means available for making illocutionary force manifest is employment of force-elucidating comments attached to utterances. (Strawson P. F., 1964, p. 450). Comments like, "This is only advice", "That was a warning" and "I am only making suggestions". Each might serve to enable uptake concerning an illocutionary act. Strawson's view of the illocutionary act can be summarized with the following points:

a) We intend that our intentions function as part of the reason that uptake of illocutionary acts is secured.
b) Our intentions can function as part of the reason that uptake is secured if they are manifest to the audience.
c) Our intentions can be made manifest by the employment of conventional means for making our intentions explicit.

Conclusion

The examination of speech act theory reveals a complex theoretical landscape with various approaches that can be broadly categorized along the convention-intention spectrum. Austin's pioneering work established the fundamental distinction between saying something (locutionary acts) and doing something through speech (illocutionary acts), while introducing the concept of felicity conditions necessary for successful performative utterances. Searle further developed this framework by distinguishing between illocutionary force and propositional content, refining the classification of speech acts, and introducing the concept of indirect speech acts, which demonstrates how linguistic meaning can extend beyond conventional interpretation.

Strawson's critique highlighted the limitations of purely conventionalist accounts by demonstrating that many illocutionary acts depend more on speaker intentions and their recognition than on conventional procedures. This intentionalist perspective, drawing on Grice's theory of meaning, emphasizes the communicative function of language over its conventional structure.

These theoretical perspectives, though divergent in their emphasis, collectively enhance our understanding of how language functions as action. The foundation established by these theorists provides a robust analytical framework that can be applied to various social issues, including the examination of hate speech, political discourse, and interpersonal communication. Future research should focus on exploring how these theoretical insights can be operationalized to address contemporary social challenges where speech acts play a significant role.

The evolving nature of speech act theory demonstrates the dynamic relationship between linguistic conventions and communicative intentions, suggesting that a comprehensive understanding of language requires attention to both dimensions. As language continues to evolve in new social and technological contexts, speech act theory remains a valuable tool for analyzing how words not only describe the world but also change it.

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Хэлэх үйлдлийн онол: Онолын үзэл баримтлал ба хэрэглээ

Уг өгүүлэл нь хэлэх үйлдлийн онолын суурь үндэслэлүүдийг авч үзэж, үүнийг нийгмийн хүрээнд хэрэглэх боломжоог судалсан юм. Үүний тулд хэлэх үйлдлийн онолын хүрээнд багтах өөр өөр байр суурийн ангилалд анхаарлаа хандуулан, Остины боловсруулсан конвенционалист хандлага, Сёрлын дэвшүүлсэн холимог хандлага, Стросоны боловсруулсан интенционалист шүүмжлэлд төвлөрөв. Локуци, иллокуци, перлокуцийн ялгаа, амжилттай хэрэгжих нөхцөл, бүрэлдлийн дүрэм, харилцаанд интенцийн гүйцэтгэх үүрэг зэргийг задлан шинжилснээр хэрхэн хэлэх үйлдэл нь хэлний болон нийгмийн харилцаанд үүрэг гүйцэтгэдэг болохыг цогц байдлаар тоймлолоо. Энэхүү суурь шинжилгээ нь хэлэх үйлдлийн онолыг нийгмийн асуудлыг судлахад ашиглах шинэ боломжуудыг харуулж буйгаараа ач холбогдолтой юм.