Философи, шашин судлал-XIV SOME NOTES ON THE TRI-PARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE *REPUBLIC*

Amantai Khajyet (M.A in Philosophy) National University of Mongolia School of Social Science Department of Philosophy

Key concepts: soul, parts of the soul, rational, irrational, desire, appetite, spirit, intellect, rational desire, affective desire, pleasure, human and class.

My aim here is to make sense of Plato's treatise on the soul in The Republic and to make some my own interpretation in that problem. Although there are many accounts and interpretations on the Plato's conception of the soul, it is still needs to be interpret according to its context but not by language analyse. I focused on the Book IV and book VII, VIII generally and put a brief description of cognitive development of the philosophers as it is related to the rational part of the soul.

The main problem within the the *Republic* regards what justice is or who the just man is. In Book 1 of the *Republic*, after a long discussion, Socrates, both with Thrasymachus and with others, concludes that "Justice is a virtue of the soul" (353). It is not advantage of the stronger, as it looks from outside. But it is good for one's soul from an inner point of view. So justice is the best performance of the soul. When Glaucon and Adeimantos are not satisfied with the definition, Socrates proceeds to compare the individual soul with a city, presuming its analogical similarity. On the assumption that there is a good soul, with the analogy of "good" (427) they construct in their mind a city, as good as is possible. They then consider an individual's soul in the following way.

Plato then presents a definition of justice that it is 'to mind one's own business and not be meddlesome is justice' (433 p.120). There are three classes in the city, first, craftsmen, money makers; secondly guardians and auxiliaries; and thirdly the ruler class. Each one has their own function and the general virtue for the each class is temperance, for the guardians it is courage, and for the rulers it is wisdom or knowledge. It is explained that justice is when each of the three classes does its own allotted work. Therefore, justice becomes 'the virtue in the city which enabled all these to find a place in it, and after they have appeared preserves them as long as it is present in the city' (433 p.120). So justice is described merely from the more general, social point of view. Then it must be similar in the case of the soul itself.

As in the city, the soul has three parts. Socrates establishes this as follows. A new principle that 'the same thing does not at one and the same time with the same part of itself and in the same

relation do opposite things' (439, 436) is used to indicate the two opposite parts of the soul which are rational and non-rational because the soul desires its object of satisfaction and it is not possible to desire and not desire at the same time with the same part, so there must be two distinct principles in the soul, and only one of them can dictate but both cannot work together. The third part of the soul is distinct from desire, for it can fight against desire when the situation comes. For instance, in case of strife between the two principles desire and reason, indignant spirit comes as a servant to aid reason. So the three elements are cooperates with each other and sometimes contradicts with one of the element. The elements or principles are not distinct entities which are sufficient themselves but cooperate or correlate with each other.

So the three elements of the soul in Plato's Republic are three types of the soul's nature. The spirited element is stronger and more intellectual than the appetite or passion, whereas desire for reason is a higher and more developed performance of human desire. These three elements can be put together by ranking.

It is worth dividing the tripartite structure of the soul in Book IV and Book VIII, IX because in the Book IV, Plato merely established the three elements of the soul. But Plato does not claim that these parts are independent from each other. These elements do not act separately but can act against each other or relate with each other. If each one could be independent and could act separately then humans cannot make decisions or even cannot act or move. One of the elements must lead or dominate by its power and rule the others to act or move the whole soul and body. Hence, the main purpose of Plato's political philosophy is the problem of ruling. So in Book IV Plato does not pose all the ideas about the tripartite soul.

In Book IV, in dividing the city into three estates, Plato also includes one important parameter: that each class has been divided according to their own intellectual capacity. So Plato expresses this idea with the allegory of metals. That is to say, the rulers are fashioned like gold, the guardians and auxiliaries are silver, and farmers and craftsmen in words productive classes can be fashioned like iron or silver. (415b). Furthermore, even among the other lower class a child could be born with the nature of gold; then this child must be educated properly and taken to the rulers' class. Conversely, if there was born a silver or iron child from the rulers class then they must be put down into their corresponding class (415a). This analogy is also comparable with the soul's inner structure. Each element of the soul is divided by its intellectual ability. For instance, the affective element is less intellectual than the spirited and the rational, whereas the spirited element is less intellectual than the rational but more intellectual than the affective element and more close to the rational element. The rational element itself is not purely intellectual, but it preserves from the irrational part only the desire for knowledge.

Principles (parts or elements)	Aims and motives (non- rational)	Virtues (rational)		Class Level
Desire (irrational) Alogistikon te kai Epithumetikon Indignation (spirited)	Pleasure Dignity and	Temperance or Moderation Temperance,	Justice, Harmony	Lower, craftsmen, money makers, merchants all others Middle,
Thumos or Thumoeides	Safe	Courage		Guardians
Intellect (rational) Logistikon	Knowledge, Ideas	Temperance, Courage, Wisdom (<i>Phronesis</i>)		Higher, Rulers

This chart illustrates the structural analogy of the tripartition of the soul and three classes of the ideal city. These three parts of the soul altogether constitute 'the whole soul' (441), but Plato just takes it without proof that it is better if the rational part rules the whole soul, because it is wise and has foresight. As in the city, if a craftsman or a guardian rules the city it will not be well ordered and not harmonic. So for each person, it is desirable for the soul to be ruled by its rational part. And each part should do its own business, and not interfere with other spheres. However, as is given in the scheme, if each part of the soul has its own function, then the better part should do its own work, ruling. So in case of action or ruling, one part or one class must rule the others. In the case of humans the rational part should rule the person; in the case of the city the educated rulers should rule the polis.

The desiring part of the soul consists of such elements as love, hunger, thirst, which are the companions of various indulgences and pleasures (439). The main aim of this part will be its object of desire, or pleasure. The desiring part's aim is not to rule the country but to earn money, getting more pleasure, or just doing its own work. So generally the lower classes' motivation is gaining pleasure within their own domain. That is why, in the first column, desire is common nature for the lower class, while its virtue should be temperance. This means that, by the principle of the better ruling, the worse (431b5) must have a rational part that must keep control of their desire in order not to let it go beyond its measure. All persons or individuals have these three parts in their soul. Therefore this principle spreads throughout the whole soul, not only the desiring part.

Plato treats desire and the rational as two opposite elements. One of them must rule or dictate; for example, if someone is thirsty and desires to drink, the intellect can stop this desire, dictating not to do it. So these two opposite elements can work together only if one of them rules

and the other follows. The argument is that by the law of non-contradiction which is defined as 'the same thing cannot move in the same time and the same relation and in opposite ways'(436 b). Therefore one of them must be the ruler, dictating action, because the rational part is the better part. Plato assumes it should rule the worse part, which is desire. In this treatment Plato does not mean in any way that reason has got motivational meaning, at least in Book IV. He simple divides rational and non-rational elements in the soul.

The second part of the soul is *thumos* or *thumoeides* (spirit). Its nature is different from desire, because in case of the indignant feelings one can go against one's own pleasure and ugliness. The specific role of this part is that in a good person it mostly allies with reason, with the rational part of the soul. For this part of the argument, Socrates shows the relation between rulers and guardians in the example of the sheep, dog and shepherds. That the Shepherd is reason and dog is associated with guardians and the sheep is the ordinary people. Socrates then concludes (441a) that if the spirited part is educated well and has a good upbringing then it is the helper of the rational part. But the rational part is different from the spirited part (441a). Then again, Socrates provides the presumption for the rational that it is appropriate to rule the whole soul, considering its foresight and wise characteristics (441e). However, the desiring part of the soul is the largest part and sometimes might go wrong in the pursuit of pleasures and then get stronger and want to rule the whole soul, destroying its harmony and the right ordering of the soul (442). Hence, it is better for the rational part to rule the whole soul. Also the reason why the rational part should rule is that it has the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul; and a city or one's soul is moderate when all parts do their own work and there is no inner war between each part; all parts recognise that the rational part should rule the whole.

In general, Plato states that desire and reason (intellect) are two opposite things. So desire can come over the opposite one, the intellect. Possibly *thumos* or the spirited part has an irrational element, but it is stronger or more powerful than just giving in to appetites and such things as thirst or sex. However, it is not as good as reason and reason can stand against and dictate or rule these parts by its wise character. That is why the spirited part should be ruled by the intellect. Then, *thumos*, the spirited part can show itself being more excellent. Therefore he assumes that the intellect or the rational part is better and it should look after and control desire.

One more thing on the nature of the human soul is that if we recall from the *Symposium* when Socrates provided a hierarchy of loving objects – from beautiful bodies to beautiful souls and activities and law, then beautiful knowledge and finally beauty itself (Symposium 210-a-e), also in Book IV of the Republic (421c, 431c, d). According to these passages, it is allowed to think that the lower class aims for pleasure and many other kinds of desire are within their natural character; for the middle class it is natural to be esteemed by rulers and others and keep safe and to show their

physical power; for the higher class or rulers it is natural to strive for knowledge and wisdom. However, all this is not only a matter of nature, but also education. Good rulers and guardian should be educated well to do their own work best (424a). Plato agrees that the majority of the population in the city mostly have these desires, pleasures and pains (431c), but also that the minority has wisdom which rules over desires.

"... but the simple and orderly desires which are guided by reason, and which accompany intelligence and right belief, you will find in a small number of men, in those who have the best natures and have received the best education" (431c).

Therefore, it is in the rulers' nature to be wise; it is in the lower classes' nature to be vulgar, etc. However, this does not mean that the lower class has no intellect or that the higher class has no desires. All human souls, as a whole, have these three parts – but by nature or education, or a wrong or right upbringing humans choose a suitable motivation for their whole life. This could be seen in Book VIII which talked about love of money, love of honour or love of knowledge.

In Book V of the *Republic* (455e- to 456b), when the speech touches on women's abilities, Plato emphasizes that each class and each person is classified by their nature. At the beginning of Book VI it was said that philosophers are able to achieve the things that are always the same, the ideas but the others, the lower classes "wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way" (484b). It is at this point possible to compare this with the idea of hierarchical love and assume that people who are from the lower class which are body lovers or custom lovers but they are lower than knowledge lovers.

In Book VI it is crucial to note that Plato provides the differences in the natures between philosophers and non-philosophers: "As those are philosophers who are able to grasp that which is always invariable and unchanging, while they who are not cannot do this but are all abroad among all sorts of aspects of many objects" (484b). Thus, philosophers desire to know the things that are eternal. Lovers of knowledge get pleasure from the soul itself, rather than bodily pleasure, if they are true philosophers. Bodily pleasures become unimportant (or disappear) for them, because smallness (pettiness) is very harmful for the soul that is striving for the divine (485d-486a). Therefore changeable things are contrary to the soul of philosophers. Even human life, which is not eternal, is not a dangerous thing and philosophers do not take it seriously and they are not afraid of it. Furthermore, they seek the truth for it is not peculiar to seek falsehood for philosophers. The truth is the closest thing to wisdom.

The idea of the Good

There is a thing by which every object of knowledge can be known. This is the idea of the good. For many non-philosophers, a good thing is pleasure, but for philosophers knowing the good

their nature or being intelligent is good. In other words, having knowledge is good for philosophers. By analogy, light allows the seeing of something; sight captures the object, but for the soul it is depicted as in the following:

'When it is stayed upon that on which truth and being are shining, it understands and knows and is seen to have reason (intelligence). But when it is stayed on that which is mingled with darkness, that which is coming into being and passing away, and then it believes and grows confused as its beliefs waver up and down, and has the appearance of being without reason.' (508d)

Plato compares the good with the sun. Sun gives light and makes possible generation or growth, but being itself not generation. The good also gives the possibility of knowledge but good is beyond the existence of things, it is transcendent.

INTELLIGIBLE	VISIBLE			Knowledge, Truth, Good
Understanding, reason (noesis)	Sun		Dialectic	
Thought (dianoia)	Human		Geometry uses hypothesis; all empirical sciences	
Opinion or belief	Animals, handicrafts	plants,	all	Personal opinions
Images (eikasia)	Shadows, reflections in water, things that are close- grained, smooth, bright, etc.		Perceptive objects	

The possibility of knowing the Good is explained by the intellectual ability of the philosopher's soul. That knowledge can be obtained in two ways. First, it can be obtained by thought or calculation. For example, mathematics and geometry deal with thought, calculating and use of some empirical or hypothetical presumptions from a beginning point. However, thoughts do not provide an understanding of the Good. Second, the Good is understandable by reasoning, which allows moving beyond the calculating ability. This is the *Nous* which Plato explains. Therefore, reason has its own inner structure and sub-elements.

The allegory of the cave

In the beginning of the Book VII (514-517b) Plato suggests imagining men whose hands, legs and heads are in chains dwelling from their childhood as prisoners. What they can see is just shadows of people or artefacts on the wall which are projected through the fire. They think that only these shadows are real things. Being able to talk with each other, they concur to guess which

shadow will appear next time, learning from the order of their appearances. But if one was released from their chains and goes out into the real world they would understand what real things are, starting to learn that the shadows of the object in the night are just shadows, and they would get to know the real objects themselves and look higher up, even until the sun, and easily adapting their eyes to the objects.

So he allegorically shows the hierarchical ascent of knowing the Good or the truth in the intelligible sphere. The sun is the idea of the Good, which is most difficult to know and understand, but it is the ultimate reason for knowing all other things and it gives them the light of the truth. All these given things are concerned with only the rational part of the soul and show the detailed way of getting to true knowledge, be it a philosopher as a person or be it the ruler of a city. No non-rational aspect has been shown in the allegory.

Plato's Republic: Books VIII-X

The previous books of the Republic were about the analogy of the inner structure of the soul and the city, then from Book IX Plato comes again to the description of the soul according to the types of ruler of a city. The nature of desire is explained more properly by comparing it to each type of ruler of a city. So it is a more concise account than the former analogy of the soul. Therefore, it can be argued that it is not correct to explain the tripartite soul by only grounding on Book VIII's doctrine of the soul, because in Book IX it is not just the doctrine of the soul but more personalized types of the rulers by analogy of three natural characters or elements of an individual. Plato puts each representative of the three types from each class or estate of the city in the ruler's role and sees how they would behave in the position of the ruler and what form of governance there would be.

Plato says that everyone has such kind of desires which are 'terrible, fierce and lawless' (572b). These appear especially during sleep, when the other parts of the soul are not active. A similar statement was mentioned before in Book II (360c, d): 'no man is willingly just, but only on compulsion ...'. Plato briefly also says that unnecessary desires are innate in all people (571b). However, the context of the first part of Book IX (571-573) was generally about the democratic person's soul, but we sympathize here only with the affective nature of desire.

Then Plato puts forward another meaning of desire: that love is tyrannical (573b). Tyrannical love has love but no moderation, and follows all kinds of pleasures, and is thus somehow similar to a drunken man. This kind of love cheats, deceives, and plunders when the possibility to gain pleasure ceases avoidance of others' suffering. When this kind of love becomes the ruler it turns to be bad for the city itself and even for the soul itself (575b, c, d). But such tyrannical love can be one's master or slave (576a). So if tyrannical love in the meaning of desire leads the whole soul then the other parts of the soul would become slaves. But tyrannical love is the

most mad and wicked, though it is the smallest part by its significance or importance (577d). Therefore this composition of the soul would be most unhappy (579c).

Then Plato again gives the three structures of the soul with a more developed point of view, such that each one had their own name. These are lovers of wisdom (philosophon), lovers of victory (philonikon) and finally lovers of money or gain (philokerdes). The reason for the latter love is that food, drink and sex can be gained by money, which are material things; courageous people love being famous and victorious, which are not material but things that only belong to the mortal life, and people who love learn strive to the truth (581 a, b, c). Charles Kahn in his article 'Plato's Theory of desire' (Review of Metaphysics, 41:1, 1987:Sept. p.77) asserts that the reason and the other parts of the soul are forms of desire. To defend his point Kahn appeal on the passage at Republic IX 580d7:

'one proper to each part, and similarly there are three desires and three rules' (one proper to each part.)

But it should be argued that those are the natural characteristics within all_people –_which are presented in their way of life (581c,_d). These three classes of persons are so, not because of the inner structure of their souls being ruled by desire or courage, but all of them should have harmonic order of the elements of their souls. They have such three different pleasures just because according to their own capacity or quality of soul they have such, aims in their life. Because of that each class follows only their own pleasures as the think best. For the lower class it is money, for the middle class it is courage and public dignity and for the philosophers it is truth or wisdom.

Plato then introduces the doctrine of pleasure, asserting that each part of the soul has their particular pleasures. Plato himself sympathises more with the rational part that has more experience of pleasure than from gaining money or honour. This is because most good judgement comes from reason, experience and insight (582a, b, c). Reasoning is man's especial instrument (582d) and reasoning judges most correctly, so the person whose soul is ruled by its rational part would be the most happy.

Although each part of the soul has their particular pleasures, Plato says that pleasure of the rational part is pure pleasure. But what does pure pleasure mean? He starts by analysing pleasures and pain, which are opposites. However, there is an intermediate state, that of rest (584). In comparison with each one pleasure or pain, the state of rest seems both pleasure and pain. For example, absence of pain seems to be pleasure. These are not pure pleasures indeed, because they are all related to the body or experienced through the body (584c). One cannot recognise pure pleasure standing at an intermediate stage. Our material world such as food and drinks are not real things; instead belief, knowledge, and the mind are more real, and they have a closer association with pure being.. Things that are concerned with the care of the soul also have more connection

with pure being. Therefore, one who deals with more real things gains real pleasure. Conversely, other types of people are described in the following:

'Then they who have no experience of insight and virtue, but spend their whole time in revelling and such-like, are carried apparently from the middle to below and back again, and wander so all their life from one to the other; but never once have they gone beyond and seem really filled with what is real, nor tasted steadfast and pure pleasure. Like beasts of the field their eyes look ever downward, their heads are bent to the ground and to the table, and so like beasts they guzzle and satisfy their lusts, and in their greedy struggle for such pleasure they butt and kick with horns and hoofs of iron, and kill each other because they cannot be satisfied, inasmuch as what they are trying to fill is not the real and continent part of themselves, nor is what they are putting into it real.' (586a, b)

Plato concludes that if both lovers of profit and lovers of victory seek for knowledge and reason according to their capacity they will gain real pleasure, because it is better to do the things which are best for its own. However, Plato warns '... but when one of the other two gets the upper hand, the result is that it does not contrive to gain its own pleasure, but even forces the others to pursue that which is foreign to them and untrue'. (587a) Plato resumes that:

-'There are apparently three pleasures, one genuine and two bastard, and the tyrant in his flight from law and reason goes to the very extremes of the bastard pleasures and beyond them, and lives with a bodyguard of slave-pleasures' (587c).

So by its quality there are two kinds of pleasures: genuine and bastard. From the pleasure point of view, the rational part or the 'philosophical part' are real and close to 'law' and 'order', and seeking for knowledge and truth provides –real pleasure (587b). Therefore, it is more convincing that all things which have a reasoning element are better for human beings. Hence there just two types of pleasures.

At the beginning of the book, it was Plato's aim in putting forward the tyrannical ruler, in which the soul rules the desiring element, also illustrating by the Tyrant that it is very harmful for both the soul and the city. Plato also presumes that the rational part or the genuine or the best part of the soul should rule the person.

The allegory or image of the soul and the difference between the just and unjust man

Socrates asks us to imagine the soul as being in three parts – a 'many-headed' beast which can produce either gentle or savage heads, of a big lion or a human. Then Plato suggests all these three creatures are part of humankind which grow naturally altogether, but it is not possible to observe these from the outside (588c, d), i.e., to read another's mind.

Thus, the unjust person is he who feeds the many-headed beast or the lion and makes them stronger than the human part of the soul (588e). So these two parts will lead the person and the

human part would be dragged by them and kill and fight with each other (589a). Therefore, all what is unjust man says is false and they do not know what they are talking about the pleasures, reputation. It looks shameful when the savage part enslaves the gentle. (589c)

Money that is gotten unjustly makes the human soul worse, and licentiousness looks like the many-headed beast because of its being given more freedom than it ought to have; obstinacy and bad temper strengthen the lion-like or snake-like part. (590a-c). So these arise because of the weakness of the best part of the soul that cannot rule the other parts, therefore such people just serve and learn how to flatter them (590c).

Hence it is better to rule the divine or the best part of the soul. It can find friendship between the other parts and keep them tame and cared for. The divine part knows the real pleasure and reputation and knows the truth, about which Plato says:

"... but we think that it is better for every man to be ruled by divinity and insight. It is best, of course, when he possesses that within him, but if he does not, it had better be put over him from outside, and then all men, being guided by the same principle, will be equals and friends as far as may be." (590d; Lindsay translation)

So it is better to be ruled by the rational part. In that meaning the soul is more valuable than the body. This kind of order allows the soul to be in harmony and one will do every possible thing to keep this condition of the soul and eschew all things which harm the soul, such as money or bodily pleasures. Therefore the intellectual one always keeps and checks his inner harmony of the soul so as not to destroy it from outside and for him. (591b, c, d)

Finally, in Book X, in discussing poetry, Plato concludes the following:

'And with regard to sexual desires, and anger, and all feelings of desire and pain and pleasure in the soul, which we say follow all our actions, you observe that poetic imitation produces all these effects in us. They should be withered, and it waters them and makes them grow. It makes them rule over us, when they ought to be subjects if we are to become better and happier, instead of worse and more miserable.' (606d)

Thus ultimately, Plato reaches the point which was held in Book I that "Justice itself is best for the soul itself" (612b). So it is clear that Plato rejects the bodily pleasures or non-rational desires, preferring rationality in all cases of life. Also it is concluded that each element of the soul has its own pleasure which means that the elements have their own non-rational positive aspects.

Comments on the *Republic*: Books VIII-IX

The general conception of Plato's philosophy in the *Republic* is, it is argued, the theory of action. In Books VIII and IX, Plato discusses not what form of government structure is best. He does not even give any suggestion about the form of the regime. He sees the entire situation from

the inner point of view. As asserted in the *Phaedo*, Plato is still taking the point of view that there are two different entities: body and soul. Bodily, material things are not a strong concern of Plato. He almost rejects the material or bodily aspects and is concerned more with things pertaining to the soul. Even in the city he sees not the form or outer structure of rule but the inner condition of the ruler. Because the element of the city is a person, Plato is considering what kind of qualities the ruler should have to rule a city. So for Plato the inner essence of a thing is more important. Even in Book I Plato comes to the conclusion that justice is excellence of the soul, but not of the man. Thus, let us note that Plato concentrates on the soul, not on the man; these are quite different terms, referring to different things. In Book I, he discusses justice from the outer point of view that justice is, as Thrasymachus says, what is good for the stronger, or that justice is doing good things for one's friends and harmful things to one's enemies, as Polemarchus suggests.

So Plato's main principle of thinking is being rational in all situations: how do we rationally do something better or how can we be better in our thinking. Again, he does not consider anything changeable or fluctuating, as of equal value to what is stable and does not change. Thus, he is interested in the city which is always the same, *sub specie aeternitatis* (under the form of the eternal). There are two realms, what is eternal and thus immortal, and what is changeable and thus mortal.

Then, if the soul is important, what does a soul consist of? It has three parts, three ruling principles: desires, the spirited, and the rational. Among the soul's parts, the desiring and the courageous parts are related to real life or this life. Desire is directed towards food, drink and sex and the like. Next, the courageous is related to honour, being proud of oneself, and will to power. All these are related to real, mortal life. However, intellect exists always. It is not mortal. Plato tried to prove the soul's immortality in the *Phaedo*; even in the *Republic*, he shows his belief in an afterlife. If one lives a good life, which means being just, one will rewarded after death. And Plato assumes that it is better that the rational part rules the soul, because all the other parts will harm it and create disharmony in the soul. The rational part can organize harmony in the soul. Therefore if such an intellectual person, whose soul is ruled by his intellect, will rule the city, it would be a better city.

Thus Plato sees the situation from the eternal perspective, from the position that is always true in all time. Also, he sees the city as best where philosopher-rulers always govern. What Plato wants to say concerns not the regime of the city, but what is important in the ruling process and in the ruler: what kind of condition of the soul is best for the ruler? Furthermore, the emphasis of Plato as regards a human being is how each individual's soul – not how each individual man –

should rule itself most correctly, and how one should act and behave better, from the inner point of view.

The distinction of the three parts of the soul is not made for the sake of the creation of something similar to the class structure in society, but because it is necessary by the nature of the soul ('necessary' in the sense of *Phaedrus* 265e). Having honour, or dignity, and being safe, and battle for the keeping one's safety and life corresponds to the *thymos*, the 'Ego'. All kinds of material demands, and bodily pleasures – food, drink, sex, money, etc. – are concerned with the care of the 'Body'.

Conversely, logos or the rational part of the soul has to do with thoughts, calculation and understanding, and all things related to knowledge. So it is reasonable to divide the soul into three parts. But, in general, two of these parts belong to the mortal life and the last one, which Plato mostly calls the best part, has an immortal quality. That is why Plato puts emphasis on the immortal part of the soul, because it is superior to the others and knows better than the others how to rule and what is best for the other parts.

Furthermore, by analogy, the inner structure of the city is also similar to the tripartite soul. If the human being is the main element of the city, the city must also have these three elements of the soul's condition. The majority of the population seek not for knowledge, but for money, for material goods. They prefer bodily pleasures. It is in their nature to strive for wealth or a material way of life. Therefore their maximum rational behaviour is moderation; the best quality of their life performance is self-discipline or moderate behaviour. Actually all classes should have selfdiscipline because all humanity has desires, yet the desiring part of the soul opposes such selfdiscipline. There are, predictably, smart people among this lower class, though Plato said they wander somewhere in the middle. This class of people Plato images as a many-headed beast in Book VIII. Why many-headed? This may be because it shows the democratic regime of the city like a many-headed beast.

The second class of the city which corresponds to the spirited (proud /competitive) part of the soul is the guardians. Their task is the security of the city and being honoured by the other classes for their victory. Such people must be educated well to secure the city. Generally, they are aggressive and proud. So their ideal behaviour, in addition to self-discipline, should be the display of courage. The definition of courage is given in the meaning of the dialogues with Laches. Plato portrays this class as a lion or snake in Book VIII, using the analogy because the tyrannical regime of the city looks like a terrifying lion or snake.

Logos or reason corresponds to the ruling class of the city, who are the most clever and intelligent people, but they are in the minority. Their nature is love of knowledge, and they strive to know the truth. So the ideal condition of their souls is wisdom, in addition to self-discipline and

courage. But the specific thing is that they have the Nous which allows them to understand what is good, and know what is good. They also know what is good for the other classes and only they can create harmony or order between the classes, who cannot rule the city. The tyrannical, oligarchic and the democratic regimes have rulers who indeed belong to the lower class. The nature of their souls is like the many-headed beast or lion. Thus, whether the concern is for a human soul or a city, it is better to be ruled by the rational element.

However, for the ruling classes to be just, this can only be when the soul is just, and only when its rational part controls the other parts. So justice is the right ordering of the soul and the classes of a city, where the better part of the soul and best class of the city rules. Book IV says that justice is each class doing its own work, but Plato gives more detail and explains more precisely that all classes or things must be in their proper place, and must do what they naturally can do. Educated intelligent people should be in the ruling role of the city, people who are aggressive and proud must belong to the guardian's class. People who can do business should do their business and not try to participate in ruling the city and must do their work as well as possible. In words, there must be harmony and order in the city, as well as in the soul.

But why does Plato make the analogy between the soul and the city? These are given the same inner isomorphic form, the same structures for action, that is to say there must be some kind of order between the ruler and ruled. Then it does not matter what kind of ruling type there should be but there must be a ruler and the ruler must rule the situation by his Nous. Instead it can be even law if it is not ruler. Even the law can become a ruling principle.

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ХУРААНГУЙ

Энэхүү өгүүлэл нь Платоны "Төр улс" зохиол дох сэтгэлийн дотоод ангилал ба тэдгээрийг ангилах болсон гол шалтгаан хийгээд нийгмийн анги давхаргуудтай адилтгаж зүйрлэсний шалгааныг гаргаж тавих гэж оролдсон юм. Улмаар энэ нь "Төр улс" зохиолын гол утга санаа нь жинхэнэ улс ямар байх ёстой вэ гэдэг талаар биш харин жинхэнэ төр улсыг удирдах ёстой хүний сэтгэл ямар байх ёстой харуулсан гэдэг дүгнэлтэд хүргэж байгаа юм. Тиймээс нийтлэл "Төр улс" зохиол дээр тулгуурласан текстийн задлан шинжилгээний аргаар тайлал, тайлбарыг хийсэн болно.