

## THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*

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The *Phaedrus*, a dialogue that is set up as a discussion of a speech advising lovers, discusses two topics. The first and main topic concerns who the true philosopher is and what his nature is. As a subtopic it discusses a methodology of philosophy. The second topic is what rhetorical speech is and who the real rhetoricians are. In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates provides two distinct speeches on the matter of love. The first speech is from 237a to 241d, the second from 244a to 257c. At the beginning of his first speech, Socrates provides a brief conception of the soul, which is similar to the previous dialogues on the soul. One of the premises is that love is some kind of desire, and the object of that desire is something beautiful.

‘Now as everyone plainly knows, love is some kind of desire; but we also know that even men who are not in love have a desire for what is beautiful. So how shall we distinguish between a man who is in love and one who is not? We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our acquired judgement that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the other. Now when judgement is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called ‘being in your right mind’; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as ‘outrageousness’. Now outrageousness has as many names as the forms it can take, and these are quite diverse. Whichever form stands out in a particular case gives its name to the person who has it – and that is not a pretty name to be called, not worth earning at all. If it is desire for food that overpowers a person’s reasoning about what is best and suppresses his other desires, it is called gluttony and it gives him the name of a glutton, while if it is desire for drink that plays the tyrant and leads the man in that direction, we all know what name we’ll call him then! And now it should be clear how to describe someone appropriately in the other cases: call the man by that name – sister to these others – that derives from the sister of these desires that controls him at the time. As for the desire that has led us to say all this, it should be obvious already, but I suppose things said are always better understood than things unsaid: The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person’s considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in human bodies – this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes its name from the word for force (*rhōmē*) and is called *eros*.’ 237d-238c

There are two elements that rule and lead the individual. One is innate desire for pleasures, and the other acquired judgement (opinion), ‘which aims at what is the best’ (237d). In other words, these are desire and reason, and each one tries to take control over the soul; they battle with each other, but sometimes there is harmony between them when reason rules and desire obeys. If reason rules there is self-control, but if desire rules the soul then there will be excess. There are many types of excess, depending on what kind of object it aims to possess. So generally its unique name is desire and its property or feature is excess. For example, the one who wants too much food is a glutton. Socrates also says one more peculiarity of the desire for beauty is its etymological origin; from the word *Eros*. For when desire takes control of the soul by power, it forces the other part to follow. So Plato emphasizes the soul parts’ enforcing character.

In fact the issue of motivation can be raised with this passage of the *Phaedrus* much more clearly than with any one in the *Republic*. Socrates uses the word ‘outrageousness’ that ‘drugs us without reasoning’; this is the very idea of motivation as a moving stimulus of action. Whereas in the case of the intellect Plato does not use any word with the implication of power or motivation; instead, he uses ‘gains control’ or ‘leads’, or just ‘reasoning’. There is thus a straightforward bipartition:

Non-rational aspect of the soul	Rational aspect of the soul
Desire (the origin of Love)	Intellect (judgement)

In the caricature of 241c-d, the following comparison is made; ‘You should know that the friendship of a lover arises without any good will at all. No, like food, its purpose is to sate hunger. ‘Do wolves love lambs? That’s how lovers befriend a boy!’”

Hence appetitive desire takes the ruling role from the rational element. He depicts purely affective desire where reasoning or deliberation has less power. According to Hackforth’s (1952) inference ‘What we have is a broad contrast, simple enough to be drawn by the average man, between unreflective desire for immediate pleasure and the reflective condition of mind which tends to run counter to that desire, though of course a harmony may be established.’<sup>1</sup>

**Socrates’ second speech: Madness**

In the second speech, Socrates attempts to establish Love not just as a form of affective desire or a matter of *epithumia*; rather, it has divine origin. Hence, Socrates treats Love as some kind of madness (*mantike* or *mania*). However there are also two types of madness that a man may have as a mortal. One is general madness, which is commonly understood as evil or bad, i.e., a mental illness. The other type<sup>2</sup> is divine madness. Among the divine there are hierarchically four forms of madness (244a-245a, 265a-b).

Love (as madness but not epithumia)	
Left side	Right side
Mental or physical <b>illness</b>	<b>Prophetic</b> divination (inspired by Apollo): <i>mantike</i>
	Frenzy by means of <b>Mystic</b> or <b>Purification</b> rites (inspired by Dionysus): <i>Theia mania</i>
	<b>Poetical</b> inspiration (inspired by the Muses)
	Madness ( <i>mania</i> ) of the <b>lover</b> (inspired by Aphrodite or <i>Erōs</i> )

The divine type of madness is not evil but positive, as it is “bestowed by divine gift” (244a9), which appears in prophets and priests and allows them to predict the future and set people on the right track. It comes in four forms.

The first form of Madness:

‘The prophethess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona are out of their minds when they perform that fine work of theirs for all of Greece, either for an individual person or for a whole city, but they accomplish little or nothing when they are in control of themselves. We will not mention the Sybil or the others who foretell many things by means of god-inspired prophetic trances and give sound guidance to many people – that would take too much time for a point that’s obvious to everyone.’ (244b)

The second form of Madness:

‘Next, madness can provide relief from the greatest plagues of trouble that beset certain families because of their guilt for ancient crimes: it turns up among those who need a way out: it gives prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the gods and in worship, discovering mystic rites and purifications that bring the man it touches through to safety for this and all time to come. So it is that the right sort of madness finds relief from present hardships for a man it has possessed.’ (244e)

The third one comes from the Muses:

‘A tender, virgin soul, and arousing it to a Bacchic frenzy of expression in lyric and other forms of poetry it educates succeeding generations by glorifying myriad deeds of those of the past; while the man who arrives at the doors of poetry without madness from the Muses, persuaded that expertise will make him a good poet, both he and his poetry, the poetry of the sane, are eclipsed by that of the mad, imperfect and unfulfilled.’ (245a)

*Erōs*, the fourth type of madness is the following:

‘Well then, the result of my whole account of the fourth kind of madness is clear – the madness of the man who, on seeing beauty here on earth, and being reminded of true beauty, becomes winged, and fluttering with eagerness to fly upwards, but unable to leave the ground, looking upwards like a bird, and

<sup>1</sup> Hackforth (1952) p. 41

<sup>2</sup> At 266a Plato shows these two types of madness as the right and left arms of a division or *dihaeresis*.

taking no heed of the things below, causes him to be regarded as mad: my conclusion is that this then reveals itself as the best of all the kinds of divine possession and from the best of sources for the man who is subject to it and shares in it, and that it is when he partakes in this madness that the man who loves the beautiful is called a lover.’ (249d4-e4)

Plato makes a clear distinction between affective desire and love (erotic love) emphasizing love’s divine or *mantic* character (244a). Thus we have the fourth type of madness. But only Erotic love strives for wisdom. These four types of madness are not correlated with affective ‘desire’ or ‘passion’, though they clearly belong to the non-rational aspect of the soul. These are non-rational aspect of the soul. If we remember the *Symposium*, then in comparison the *Phaedrus*’ conception of love becomes more systematic and more distinct and vivid in content. In the *Symposium*, Plato agrees through Socrates that Love is a lack of something, but the object of that lack is the good, and beautiful things<sup>3</sup> (200d-201c), whereas in the *Phaedrus* Socrates distinguishes the desire or the lack of something from *Eros* as a divine entity. In fact, the *Symposium* has rational desire in contrast with bodily desire, but for the origin or foundation of the desire grounded by affective desire Plato uses the Greek word *epithumia*, while in *Phaedrus* *Erōs* is called divine *mania*. In the *Symposium*, for example, prophetic inspiration and such kinds of things were the peculiar characteristics of *Eros*. Now in the *Phaedrus*, these things are distinct according to their type of madness. However, in the *Symposium* there was a hierarchical structure of love – or reproduction, in the sense of spiritual reproduction. Further, the highest mode is one that loves the beautiful. Hence the purpose of the *Phaedrus* is Plato’s further reflection on *Erōs*, cardinally distinguishing affective desire from *Erōs*. Summarizing the notion of madness and all four kinds of madness, Plato presents the following dialogue:

Socrates: “I thought you were going to speak the truth, and say ‘madly’; and that, in fact, was the very thing I was looking for. We said, didn’t we, that love was a kind of madness?”

Phaedrus: Yes.

Socrates: And that there were two kinds of madness, the one caused by sicknesses of the human sort, the other coming about from a divinely caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving.

Phaedrus: Certainly.

Socrates: And of the divine kind we distinguished four parts, belonging to four gods, taking the madness of the seer as Apollo’s inspiration, that of mystic rites as Dionysus’, poetic madness, for its part, as the Muses’, and the fourth as that belonging to Aphrodite and Love; the madness of love we said was best, and by expressing the experience of Love through some kind of simile, which allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth, though maybe also it took us in a wrong direction, and mixing together a not wholly implausible speech, we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story, in a fittingly quiet way, to my master and yours, Phaedrus, Love watches over beautiful boys.” (265a-c4)

### **The ontological account of the soul**

Plato presents a brief proof of the immortality of the soul, an issue which he had already discussed in *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Socrates states that ‘all souls are immortal’ (245c) and the arguments for immortality of the soul are:

- It always moves and ‘moves itself’ and ‘never stops’ (245c).
- There is no source of movement, therefore no destruction
- It is the source of itself and the source of everything else.
- It is also indestructible, and therefore immortal.<sup>4</sup>

Hence, the soul is also the first principle of the other movements. Furthermore, in case of a material object if it is moved not from the outside but from within, then it has soul and according to our proof that ‘whatever moves itself is only soul’, the soul that has body also does have no birth or death (245e). All human souls, too, are also immortal.

### **The allegory of the charioteer and soul structure**

According to Socrates, the soul can be imagined as a charioteer with a winged pair of horses. He says: ‘Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer’ (246a). The Gods, who have souls, have both good horses and good charioteers. Mortal humans have souls not all good; they have instead different kinds of horses. One of the horses is ‘good and noble’ (246b), the other

<sup>3</sup> Let us note that in the *Symposium* soul does not have any partition or division, Plato treats the soul there as a whole and the soul is only the philosopher’s soul.

<sup>4</sup> The construction of the argument is my own. Bett (1986) has more detailed analysis on the argument pp.3-16

is opposite in its nature; Socrates mentions that it ‘has an opposite sort of bloodline’ (246b), which means that its origin is different by nature and in its nature. The problem is then in the ruling of these two opposite types of horse. It is a difficult task for charioteer.

Socrates claims ‘living things are said to include both mortal and immortal beings’ (246b). Clearly Plato divides or constructs the soul from two ontologically different entities. The soul itself rules everything that has no soul, as the soul has the nature of being the source of every motion. When the horses are ‘perfectly winged’, the soul rules the ‘whole cosmos’ and travels in heaven, as the whole world is under its control. The gods, being perfect and having two good horses, keep their journey in heaven (246c). As far as the mortals are concerned, those who have lost their wings fall down until they encounter something hard and move into this hard body; they then become mortal creatures in this composition of soul and body. Thus it is that mortals have a soul and body. Plato also expresses the unity of the body and soul as ‘imprisoned like an oyster’ (250c7).

The scheme for dividing the soul into subclasses can be illustrated as follows:

Non-rational impulse or desire	Rational impulse and enthusiasm	Reason (intellect)
Desire (Licentious black horse)	Impulse that can be persuaded/ educated (noble white horse)	Charioteer

Within the allegory, in respect of the mortals, ‘the wings are the main problem. The wing’s function is to bear ‘all the things belonging to the sphere of the body’ to go upwards, to where the Gods reside. There, in the divine world, where the ‘plumage of the soul is most nourished and increased while the shameful, the bad and in general the opposite of the other things make it waste away and perish’ (246e). For it was mentioned that there are two worlds: one is what comes into being, the other is the being; to this heavenly world of ‘being’ the soul of a man strives. This is the same as the assertion that the body feeds on food, while the soul feeds on pure knowledge and insight. Also the soul has more shares in the divine by its immortal attributes.

The charioteer’s previous dwelling place or pasture was the upper world. The charioteer rules and leads the horse but what it takes upwards is their ‘wing’. So the ‘wing’ has or was also fed and been nourished where the charioteers dwelt. Being of this nourishment, the wings become no longer powerful enough to carry the horses and charioteer (248b, c). Due to the fourth kind of madness, Erotic *mania*, which was mentioned before (249d4-e4), the soul becomes winged and strives to go upwards to the divine world or area of truth. Indeed, only the philosopher’s soul becomes winged, by memory, and the ability to think or by intellect (249c). However, for all mortal souls, it is not possible to fully attain the divine world or the real being. Nevertheless, if one’s soul can live a just and moderate life then there is a hope that a person’s soul could attain the divine world earlier or quicker than the other souls (249a-c).

Thus there are three imagined faculties in the soul: the charioteer, the good horse, and bad horse. What pulls down to the world as it comes to being is the black horse. So the function of the two horses is different. The charioteer rules the two horses that are the other two elements of the soul. The charioteer in its turn resembles reason and intellect. It is common to interpret this image as follows: the good horse is the image of the spirited part of the soul (*thumos*) and the bad horse is the projection of desire (or passion *epithumia*). But the image of the white horse that seems to be the *thumos* in the following passage gives us the understanding that it is rather separate desire that is originally distinct from appetite. So in general the horses are two types of non-rational aspect of the soul: one is good, the other is bad. It is worth quoting the whole paragraph about these two horses of the soul that Plato describes as follows:

‘In the beginning of our story we divided each soul into three parts, two being like steeds and the third like a charioteer. Well and good. Now of the steeds, so we declare, one is good and the other is not; but we have not described the excellence of the one nor the badness of the other, and that is what must now be done. He that is on the more honourable side is upright and clean-limbed, carrying his neck high, with something of a hooked nose: in colour he is white, with black eyes: lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty: one that consorts with genuine renown, and needs no whip, being driven by the word of command alone. The other is crooked of frame, a massive jumble of a creature, with thick short neck, snub nose, black skin, and grey eyes; hot-blooded, consorting with wantonness and vainglory; shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad.

Now when the driver beholds the person of the beloved, and causes a sensation of warmth to suffuse the whole soul, he begins to experience a tickling or pricking of desire; and the obedient steed, constrained now as always by modesty, refrains from leaping upon the beloved; but his fellow, heeding no more the driver's goad or whip, leaps and dashes on, sorely troubling his companion and his driver, and forcing them to approach the loved one and remind him of the delights of love's commerce. For a while they struggle, indignant that he should force them to a monstrous and forbidden act; but at last, finding no end to their evil plight, they yield and agree to do his bidding. And so he draws them on, and now they are quite close and behold the spectacle of the beloved flashing upon them. At that sight the driver's memory goes back to that form of Beauty, and he sees her once again enthroned by the side of Temperance upon her holy seat; then in awe and reverence he falls upon his back, and therewith is compelled to pull the reins so violently that he brings both steeds down on their haunches, the good one willing and unresistant, but the wanton sore against his will. Now that they are a little way off, the good horse in shame and horror drenches the whole soul with sweat, while the other, contriving to recover his wind after the pain of the bit and his fall, bursts into angry abuse, railing at the charioteer and his yoke-follow as cowardly treacherous deserters. Once again he tries to force them to advance, and when they beg him to delay awhile he grudgingly consents. But when the time appointed is come, and they feign to have forgotten, he reminds them of it, struggling and neighing and pulling until he compels them a second time to approach the beloved and renew their offer; and when they have come close, with head down and tail stretched out he takes the bit between his teeth and shamelessly plunges on. But the driver, with resentment even stronger than before, like a racer recoiling from the starting-rope, jerks back the bit in the mouth of the wanton horse with an even stronger pull, bespatters his railing tongue and his jaws with blood, and forcing him down on legs and haunches delivers him over to anguish.'<sup>5</sup>(253d-254e)

Clearly such words as 'the lover of glory', 'needs no whip', 'driven by the words of command' definitely describe characteristics of the spirited part of the soul. Plato adds such property as 'joined with restraint and a sense of shame'. Therefore the tripartition of the soul is still valid for Plato. However the problem is whether one should choose a moderate rational life or the life of fulfilment of the affective desire. So in case of the philosopher's soul the main battle goes on between the black horse, from one side, and the charioteer with the white horse, on the other side, when they face the matter of love, as the white one is always on the charioteer's side and never goes beyond the charioteer's commands. Yet the black horse (desire, passion) always pulls down the whole because it is more powerful and 'there is no limit to their plight' (254b). Finally, both the white horse (striving for knowledge) and the charioteer fight against the black horse, attempting to give direction to the black one. As we remember in the *Republic*, it is the spirited part that helps reason to keep the soul in a harmonic and ordered condition. Thereby, the main battle in the soul goes between bodily desire and spiritual pleasure (or contemplation). Then the charioteer, still remembering his divine world where he saw his true home and dwelling place, reminds himself about their main purpose to go up there, and, using his all power, takes control (254e). But it does mean that the charioteer has himself some motivational force or some power of his own; however, it has nothing to with the general picture of the allegory. If the charioteer has the real power or motivational force, then there would not have been any struggle or difficulty with the horses that really, by their own main function, drag the chariot, but not charioteer. But only with the white horse as ally can the charioteer defend the ruling position. So, here we still see the confrontation between affective desire and intellectual enthusiasm. But the establishment of the tripartite soul in *Republic* Book IV had a slightly different aspect by which Plato constitutes the three phenomenal nature of the soul that can lead the person during his life stream. For instance, it is not possible to want to drink and not want to drink. Also we can make an inference from here that the soul's origin is not a middle agent or a kind of messenger, as depicted in the *Symposium*, but is originally from the upper, divine world, for the soul has an immortal property.

The general spirit of the second speech of Socrates can be summarized by Hackforth (1952) words:

'the whole account of the soul's nature, its immortality and its after-life, was introduced for the sake of proving that the madness of the lover is the supreme gift of the gods. Now that we have learnt of the soul's vision of the Forms, and of its power of recalling them to memory, the proof can be given; in brief it is this, that love is the restoration of the soul's wings, in other words the regaining of its divine purity (246d), through the contemplation of the Form of beauty. All the rest of the *mythikoshymnos* is an expansion of this conception of love, together with an account of that *skaioserōs* (as it comes to be

<sup>5</sup> Hackforth's (1952) translation.

called, 266a) which results immediately from the indiscipline of the horse of evil, and ultimately from the imperfect vision, or the inability to recall the vision, of beauty itself.

In the two earlier speeches love had been considered only from the standpoint of the *eromenos*. That was natural enough, for in both of them the speaker was concerned to set forth the advantage or detriment ensuing to the recipient. But now we are told that love is a supreme blessing 'both for him that has' the madness 'and for him that shares therein' (249e). These are the lover and the beloved respectively. Since the whole of Socrates' second discourse is addressed, like the other two, to the *paiskalos* (243e9, 256e3), the benefit ensuing *toiechonti* is, strictly speaking, an irrelevant consideration; but in point of fact the cadre of the speech is half-forgotten by Socrates (and Plato), as it probably will have been by the reader, and it would be cavil to reckon this as an artistic defect; in any case the good of the lover and of the beloved are one and indivisible, as we shall soon see.<sup>6</sup>

Now initially for the people who read first time the *Phaedrus* it seems that reason (intellect) corresponds to the charioteer and having in mind the tripartition of the soul from the Republic we presumably simile the two horses as the elements desire and spirit respectively, however, one possible interpretation of the allegory of the charioteer is if we read the passage<sup>7</sup> 253d-254e carefully then it becomes clear that Plato means the white horse as rational desire and the charioteer as the solely intellect or at least self or personality. But it is just presumption. Even though the problem of dualism is important for Plato, thereby it is focused to resolve whether to follow a well-ordered life or not.

'Well then, if the better elements of their minds get the upper hand by drawing them to a well-ordered life, and to philosophy, they pass their life here in blessedness and harmony, masters of themselves and orderly in their behaviour, having enslaved that part through which goodness enters it; and when they die they become winged and light, and have won the first of their three submissions in these, the true Olympic games – and neither human sanity nor divine madness has any greater good to offer a man than this. But if they turn to a coarser way of life, devoted not to wisdom but to honour, then perhaps, I suppose, when they are drinking or in some other moment of carelessness the licentious horses in the two of them catch them off their guard, and bringing them together take that choice which is called blessed by the many, and carry it through; and once having done so, they continue with it, but sparingly, because what they are doing has not been approved by their whole mind.' (256a-c)

Here we can draw a conclusion that the philosopher's soul becomes winged after death when he lives his life according to reason or justice, being master of his desires. Thus, during the bodily life, the soul will never reach the divine world and never can contemplate it. The main message here is that the better parts of the soul, reason and its rational desire, avoid as much as possible the 'coarser way of life', these are important factors for philosophers. Though if one chooses philosophy and devotes oneself to loving wisdom one might benefit more than were one to choose a normal human life.

Therefore there are just two ways of life. One is being master of oneself, living a just live and devoting oneself to knowledge. The other life is coarse and lives under the pressure of bodily desires by necessity.

With regard to the allegory of charioteer, it is worth discussing Ferrari's (2008) article with some preliminary interpretation of my own. If in the *Republic*, especially in the Book IV, Plato had a functional division of the soul in three parts as a way of action, then in the *Phaedrus* Plato gives a conceptually more developed picture of the soul structure. Giving the more precise description of the charioteer's allegory in 253c-255a, Plato himself suggests that, together with white horse, the charioteer as a symbol of reason has not only a ruling and reasoning capacity but it has the power to struggle or fight with the black horse, which at some point Plato meant to represent a feeling of shame.<sup>8</sup> Similar to the *Republic*, in the allegory of charioteer, the white horse is also ally of reason and obedient to it. They are both being one team against the black horse's brutal lust. So Plato begins to add some motivational meaning, moving power for the parts of the soul. The motivational meaning of the soul parts was not explicit in *Republic* IV. We cannot define in Plato's allegory of the charioteer which part or which aspect is meant to be motivation, whether it is the travelling chariot itself, or the goading of charioteer or the dragging power of the horses or the wing itself. For the reader, it is clear that the struggle in the soul goes between not three sides but two. Thus Plato's main

<sup>6</sup> Hackforth (1952) p. 94

<sup>7</sup> Compare this passage with *Rep.* IX (580-581)

<sup>8</sup> See 254a, 256a: Plato gives meaning in the white horse not only meaning of self-honor, but feeling of shame which allow as treat the *thumos* as ego, on the whole.

idea comes at *Phaedrus* 256a, namely whether the higher element wins, which would lead to ordered rule of the philosophic life, or the lower, which leads to a non-philosophic life covetous of honour, careless and undisciplined. Thus, on the whole, Plato suggests two ways of life. Consequently, there are two forms of soul *sub specie aeternitatis*. In that context, Ferrari (2008) gives a rather anthropomorphised interpretation of the soul parts, as if multiplying in soul parts. In his footnote he gives the name ‘*homunculi*’<sup>9</sup> to the parts of the soul. We also don’t agree with his interpretation that ‘the parts of soul stand for a choice of live’. The live choice depends on which part of the soul wins in the fight between black horse and the team of charioteer with white horse. The soul’s nature depends on which part rules the whole soul and what kind of order there is in it, because already in the beginning of the dialogue at 237 d-e, Plato established the twofold problem of ruling the soul.

As far as white horse is concerned, it symbolises a feeling of shame, loving of honour and obedience; he supports the charioteer in the battle with the black horse, because he is a friend of true opinion. Hence for Plato there are only two principal divisions: immortality or not. Thus of course all life matters belong to the mortality. So on the one hand *thumos* as the white horse has got mortal life characteristics such as honour, shame, spiritedness, courage, an egoistic self, right opinion and not knowledge, thus it should belong to the mortal aspect. On the other hand, the white horse is also same as the gods’ teams of horses. Also the white horse is originally from the heaven, the upper world. Its origin is already defined in 246a-b and 248c as by nature their place and ancestors where different from those of the black horse. Thereby we can see that there is an indefinite picture of the *thumos* element in the soul for Plato. Some scholars, particularly Robinson (1970), assume that there is a ‘fundamental lack of distinction between good horse and charioteer.’<sup>10</sup>

The second topic of the dialogue is rhetoric. Philosophic speech is the best art of speech or rhetoric. Without knowing the truth, it could not be the true art of rhetoric. But what is to know the truth? One must know the resemblance and dissimilarity of existing things because it is not a matter of persuading by untrue opinion (261, 262a). Therefore, a rhetorician should know precisely about the content of his speech and should express it in the right order, ‘like a living creature’. Here must be used dialectical method where both synthetic and analytic ways are utilised to put together a speech. The synthetic one is putting forward the general definition of the things. For instance, Love is some kind of madness, etc. The analytic type of method is dividing and classifying each part of the things mentioned. Here we divided the non-rational part of the soul as one form together and dividing it into two classes ‘just as a single body naturally has its parts in pairs’, something like a ‘left-handed’ and ‘right-handed’ side of the body. (266a) Similar forms of thinking, ‘division’ and ‘collections’, are the real dialectics. In the case of rhetorical speech, it is all about conviction of the soul. Thereby one must know the right or rational way of giving a speech.

Socrates: Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of the soul, the man who is going to be an expert in rhetoric must know how many forms soul has. Their number is so and so, and they are of such and such kinds, which is why some people are like this, and others like that; and since these have been distinguished in this way, then again there are so many forms of speeches, each one of such and such a kind. So people of one kind are easily persuaded for this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion, while people of another kind are for these reasons difficult to persuade; having then grasped these things satisfactorily, after that the student must observe them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice, and be able to follow them with keen perception, or otherwise get no advantage, as yet, from the things he heard earlier when he was with me. But when he both has sufficient ability to say what sort of man is persuaded by what sorts of things, and is capable of telling himself when he sees him there that this is the man and this the nature which was discussed before, now actually present in front of him, to whom he must now apply these kinds of speech in this way to persuade him of this kind of thing; when he now has all of this, and has also grasped the occasions for speaking and for holding back, and for speaking concisely and piteously and in an exaggerated fashion, and for all the forms of speeches he may learn, recognising the right and the wrong time for these, then his grasp of the science will be well and completely finished, but not before that; but in whichever of these things someone is lacking when he speaks or teaches or writes, and says that he speaks scientifically, the person who

<sup>9</sup> If each part of the soul is like a person then it implies that in that person there are again three parts, which has *logistikon*, *epithumia* and *thumos*; there would be an infinite regress. Therefore parts as *homunculi* can be treated in metaphorical sense. Indeed Plato after the *Phaedrus* begins to treat the soul parts as belonging to two principles, such as divisible and indivisible or limited or unlimited.

<sup>10</sup> Robinson (1970) p. 117

disbelieves him is in the stronger position. Well then, Phaedrus and Socrates, perhaps our writer will say, 'do you agree, or should we accept it if the science of speaking is stated in some other way?' 271d-272b

This idea is also true in matters concerning political rule in the *Republic*. For justice is a matter of the soul or even excellence of the soul; then one should put forward what a soul is and its inner distinctions and see its order and define where justice must be in the soul. Therefore, the general framework of thinking is almost the same as the *Republic*. So the core message for our problem, from the quote, is that without analysing the soul one cannot make good speech or master one's self and, most significantly, one cannot convince other people of the truth. In other words, knowing one's self and inner harmony or having an ordered soul, one can succeed in any field of art. Plato's therefore asserts that knowing the nature and structure of the soul is important for any situation.

### SUMMARIZING COMMENTS

The parts (partition) in the soul can be established from Plato's ontology. Plato divides the universe into two: Being and Becoming, the world of things that come to be. From such a dualistic point of view, there are two elements in the soul, of which one belongs to the mortal life and another to the immortal. But in the *Phaedo*, particularly, the soul is not divided into two or three parts or principles, Plato presents it as one whole and opposite to that he puts the body, with all other irrational parts and aspects as related to the body (68d). Therefore, from the ontological point of view, there is a bifurcated soul for Plato generally, though not in the *Phaedo*.

However, when we read the *Republic* or *Phaedrus*, then it comes to be that there are three elements of the soul. One of them is more related to desires, affection or passion. The other related to the spirited part. That is to say, love of honour, a sense of shame, pride, courage and anger are the conditions that the soul wants to keep safe the life itself (the human body, and anima) and not standing for unjust things for the sake of the soul. Then the last part is reason, which is opposite to the affective desires. In the *Republic* Plato does say that these two parts belong to the one type that is in terms of pleasure, 'bastard' pleasures, and in the *Phaedrus*, Plato depicts soul, allegorically, as a charioteer with two horses, that one is characterised as good and the other not (253d). Yet this allegory of the soul conceptually is not compatible with the *Republic*'s tripartite soul and contextually do not correspond with all parts of the soul. So indeed it seems contradicted from the surface of the situation.

In contrast in the *Philebus*, Plato has two types: Pleasure, and Reason. And each one has many elements within them, which shows the dialectic correlation of many in the one and the one in the many, wherein this many of the elements can even be opposite things. Also in general Reason and Pleasure belong to the one mixed thing that is the soul. Now in *Philebus* Plato assumes that Pleasures are not comes from body as he claimed in *Phaedo* but arise in soul. I support Hackforth (1952) position that on the whole, we have the following variations on the soul parts: 'Instead of the three parts of soul recognised in the *Republic*, reason, 'spirit' and affective desire, among which there may or may not be harmony or order, here in the *Phaedrus* we have got 'two sorts of ruling or guiding principle' 237d. There are however other cases in the dialogues of the bipartition of soul: in the *Republic* itself there is that of a rational and irrational part (604-5), while in the *Timaeus* the division is into the immortal and mortal parts, and in the latter it is subdivided into a better part and a worse one (69e), corresponding to the two lower parts of *Rep. IV*,' So he does not try to accommodate each conceptions of soul. Following the dialogue's subject and ontological assumption Plato explains the soul slightly different. But, in fact, the conceptions of soul do not contradict substantially.

Therefore the structural division of the soul in the *Phaedrus* is the beginning of the soul's conception in the *Philebus*'. What is new in the *Phaedrus* is the interpretation of love as a class of madness so Plato puts aside the reason, focuses on the non-rational aspect of soul and classifies all the types of madness This madness is a divine madness which leads the soul to the world of the gods. According to Socrates there are four kinds of divine madness. First, there is the madness of prophetic inspiration; second, the madness of mystical providence; third, the madness of poetical inspiration; and, fourth, is the love of wisdom or strivings towards what is beautiful and truth.

In the Socrates' speeches of both dialogues *Philebus* and *Phaedrus*, the same point is highlighted about the confrontation of the two desiring and reasoning parts of the soul. The battle between the wretched horse and the charioteer is an allegorical explanation of the bodily pleasures and the intellect (rational desire). Also such properties as 'force' and 'excess' of desire, which Socrates pointed towards, tells us that the soul as a whole has inherent antagonisms between two distinguishable intentional powers.



The madness is, allegorically, illustrated by the wings of the soul that carry everything that belongs to the soul, but these wings are not the ruler of the soul. This is in a modern conception something like the moving power of something or the engine of a car, etc., and the ruler is the driver. In our case, the 'charioteer' is the illustration of reason or intellect in the soul. So these two elements, reason and madness, are the main factors within this philosophy. Socrates says that only the philosopher's soul can become winged. The white horse of the philosopher's soul can defeat the black one and take the charioteer upwards to the Gods.

However, a problem occurs with regard to madness. In the first speech Socrates defined love as a desire, but in the second speech love turns to be madness, yet it is not just madness in the common understanding, it is rather divine madness. Meanwhile the allegory of the charioteer reveals the two horses that he leads, and these two black and white horses correspond to the desiring and spirited elements of the soul. The black horse often drags the whole down and the charioteer tries to regain control. So the contradiction appears between the two conceptions of love as desire and love as madness, especially madness and desire are quite distinct in the second speech. It seems like madness is the wing and desire turns out to be the black horse, though this is before it has been stated that love is some kind of madness. Indeed 'madness' was divided into two classes. One is that 'bestowed by divine gift', the other is 'caused by sickness of the human body' (*Phaedrus* 244a); however, the second one does not relate to the desiring kind. Thus, the divine madness are something different from the bodily desires.

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates accepts that the gods bind the body and soul forever – there is no argument and this circumstance does not seem to need a proof. This is important because it means that Plato does not provide any reasonable answer how and why the body and soul were bound together.

There is a possibility of establishing his dualism as a united system. From here we can conclude that the material world and world of the ideas do not exist completely independent<sup>11</sup>. They are rather hierarchical levels of one united universe. On the other hand, we can try to accommodate them seeing Plato's *Republic* and *Phaedrus* and *Philebus* in general that the 'order' or 'harmony' remain a fundamental principle of his whole philosophical position. So this main concept makes possible that the two controversial worlds to exist hand by hand.

There is another significant peculiarity of the soul: it is in eternal movement. Plato claims that soul is that which 'moves itself' and 'never stops' (*Phaedrus* 245e). So this eternal movement is the catalyst of everything of the becoming world. It is that which gives life in nature according to Plato. Thus, the soul is in eternal movement and never comes into being or perishes. This argument of the immortality of the soul is quite new (in the previous dialogues it has not appeared) and becomes one of the basic arguments of Plato to prove the soul's immortality and its importance for his philosophical system.

Such concepts as 'desire', 'force', 'excess' and 'madness' in the *Phaedrus* are the notions that have motivational, actionable or rather non-rational meaning (content). They belong to the non-rational part of the soul. However, the soul as a whole performs within a rather new concept than in the *Phaedo*, in the dialogue it is treated like a movement that moves itself and gives movement to all existing things. Meanwhile in the *Phaedo* the cognitive soul correlates to all that are immortal, imperishable, invisible, and unchangeable and that which stays always same. Thus it causes a new question in the Platonic philosophy regarding to what extent or how compatible the two definitions of the soul are: eternal movement of the soul and the soul that is always the 'same'. The reason for the question is that any kinds of change, fluctuation or generation are a peculiarity of the becoming world, while the world of being is the opposite of the becoming. So how Plato does makes compatible un-changeable being with becoming? This problem leads us to the *Timaeus*, another of the late dialogues, where we might well find the answer.

To sum up, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato's doctrine of soul has not changed in principle. The ontological dualism is still underlying the theory of soul, here, but has been enriched with a more detailed account, and with more complex characteristics and functions in its structure. The parts are not proper functions now, but get a motivational aspect.

<sup>11</sup> At the moment, in the context of *Phaedrus* we can draw a picture of his ontology as I depicted but later in *Timaeus* and *hilebus*, we will see how Plato has changed his ontological account from dualism to four fold principles that are limited, unlimited, mixture of this two, and the cause of the mixture. So Plato had tried to establish a philosophical foundation to his ontological dualism.

## CONCLUSION

(*The Phaedrus* in the light of other Platonic dialogues)

In the beginning of his 'Metaphysics', Aristotle states: 'ALL men by nature desire to know'<sup>12</sup>. The statement is quite obvious for us. However if there were Plato, he would not agree with this statement. According to Plato, there are two sort of people whose soul is by nature seek for true knowledge, for true being, ultimately, for real ideas, and those who seek for material good, during their whole live time. Seeking true knowledge is innate for some souls but not for every person's soul. Thus not all men by nature desire real knowledge. This is what we achieved after our investigation.

When Plato was making his ontological foundation of his dualism that is based on corporeal and non-corporeal world, he needed to prove that the soul or something in us has to be able to connect to this non-corporeal, in which all things exist by their real nature. For if soul (*psuche*) has not any capacity to contemplate it or could not deal with the intelligible world, and then this intelligible world would seem as terra incognita. Thus when he argued for the immortality of soul, he treated the soul as purely intellectual entity and implicitly motivated by its own nature. Thereby already in *Phaedo*, Plato dividing the world into being and becoming also divided humankind into those who love wisdom and knowledge and those who love body and all that belongs to the mortal life. Consequently if there two kinds of men then there must be two kind of soul as well. If there were mortal soul, there is nothing to do with the non-corporeal world. That is why he needed to establish the immortality of the soul by rational argument and did not just leave it to the area of faith. Thereby one of the aims in the *Phaedo* is that philosophers are concerned with only their soul but not body.

However, Plato needed to establish not only the rational or rather cognitive aspect of the soul as immortal but he needed to establish the motivational activity that leads or directs the soul to the area where it can reveal its true nature. Thus in *Symposium* the soul is treated from the other side of soul as wholly motivated or stimulated motional aspect while in the *Phaedo* soul is depicted as almost pure intellect or understanding. Thus all non-rational aspects are relegated to bodily matters. In general, the inference from *Symposium* is that there is a desire that can be divided in two aspects: one is bodily desire, the other is rational desire. Correspondingly the aim of the *Symposium* was that for philosophers there is a special kind of desire, peculiar only to them.

Plato's division of soul was mainly by its functional capacity. He provides the three elements of the soul by its situational condition, but meant the soul as a whole one. The whole soul itself according to the principle of justice must be organised only if the reason rules and the others also do their own work: fighting for the defence and being honoured, working for the wealth, producing and getting pleasure from material good.

In the *Republic*, particularly in Book IV, there is no implication about the doctrine of motivation. Plato, indeed, exhausted all possible divisions, when he divided the soul into three aspects. According to Plato, these kinds or parts of the soul appear only in this threefold way and define a human's nature.

Constructing a tripartite soul in the *Republic* Plato explicitly tells the readers that there are only two kinds of soul organisation: whether the soul should be ruled by reason (*logistikos*) or not. And the main battle within the soul goes on between the bigger part which is appetitive desire and reason with spirit. Thus intellect gets enough power to fight with *epithumia* thanks to *thumos*.

Thus from the ontological or the real truth perspective, there are generally two types of person: philosophers and non-philosophers. This distinction was made by Plato on the ground of his ontology that is divided as: intelligible world and visible world.

The intellect as a faculty of knowledge has hierarchical levels in itself that consist of belief or opinion (*pistis*), thought (*dianoia*) and reason (*nous*). But Plato still does not make any attempt to differentiate the motivational aspects of the soul and cognitive ability of the reason. He seems to be differentiating it from *Phaedrus*. Plato has some embryonic ideas on that point in the *Republic*.

That embryonic idea about motivational or non-rational aspect of the soul appears in Book VIII. He assumes that there are three forms of pleasure that corresponds to each type of the soul. However, even these three pleasures also can be divided in two parts. One is pure pleasure which is genuine, the other pleasures linked with pleasure and pain that are bastard pleasures. Therefore here we also have twofold pleasures from the ontological point of view.

In general, Plato has three conceptual types of tripartition. First, the inner structure of the soul is

<sup>12</sup> W. D. Ross, (Trans.) *METAPHYSICS* by Aristotle Book I, 1

tripartite. Second, there are three different types of individual. Third, there are three categories of classes in a city. All these levels are in some respect presented in the *Republic* and if we ignore or eliminate one of these aspects then it would mislead us in understanding Plato's doctrine of psychology.

On the other hand, to these three aspects Plato attaches his dualism, showing his preference for when the reasoning element rules and establishes harmony within the soul. Thus even for Plato and for our investigation there is no contradiction between the tripartite soul and Plato's own psychological dualism, because the tripartition is a structure within the soul, whereas dualism is form of soul organization. Thus dualism of Plato's psychology means there are two organizations of the soul as a whole. The first type of the soul is philosophical which has harmony in it and the second type of soul is non-philosophical and therefore there is no harmony in it.

Furthermore, if we believe and accept Stocks' (1915) argumentation on the tripartite soul and we conclude that the tripartite soul or rather tripartite classification of individual and city originated from Pythagoreans, then the psychological dualism is Plato's own doctrine and Plato just took from the Pythagoreans their idea, adopting it as inner elements of the soul.

Thereby the ethical value in *Republic* is that if there is a harmony in the soul therefore soul is just, and when there is a harmony in the soul therefore the city is just. There can be harmony or disharmony. This is what I call Plato's psychological dualism.

Plato comes back to his dualism again in *Phaedrus* to make it clear and to show that if one knows human nature or rather nature of the soul then one can be good at not only ruling oneself or ruling the city but also convincing people and giving a speech. In his first speech of Socrates in *Phaedrus* there are only two forms of ruling the soul: first, reason can rule the soul, second the appetitive-desire can rule the soul. Plato just omits about second type of ruling the soul until the precise explanation of charioteer's horses. And he attempts to argue that there is a special type of soul that is originally different from other types of soul. Their passion for knowledge is naturally different from just appetite.

However, this dualism arises from its inner struggle between the appetitive-desire (*epithumia*) and reasoning (*logistikon*).

In the *Timeaus* Plato conserves his tripartite soul attempting to reconcile it with his ontological dualistic principle. On the ontological level three elements are Being, Same and Different. Each element consists of two natural characters which are divisible and indivisible. In the embodied material world the three parts occupy a certain human physiological aspect. However, the main criterion of division is mortality. By this dimension only the rational part is immortal while the other two parts are mortal. Thus we can judge this as a dualistic basis of Plato's psychology.

However, it was still uncertain about the non-rational side of the intellect in the form of true pleasure. It cannot be just the highest form of brutal appetite or desire. Plato has still some idea about how to establish his position. Because in the beginning of the *Timeaus* we have divisible and indivisible nature in each part which means that motivational and calculative capacity can be two sides of one element.

Since in the *Timeaus* human soul is explained from a more materialistic approach, Plato correlates each part of the soul to a certain organ or part in the body. Intellect is in the head, spirit is between the midriff and the neck and affective desire is somewhere in the belly. It is logical to explain the rational desire based on bodily desire. But Plato still has confusion about the rational desire so he attempts to establish it in the *Philebus*.

The *Philebus* is the culmination of both his ontology and psychology. He uses the dialectical approach to elements of soul. Each faculty of soul acts with combinations of cognitive ability and pleasurable feelings. This account becomes clear solely in *Philebus*, while in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* it was implicit and Plato has not got clear understanding or imagination about this dialectical approach. Because of that many scholars interpret that each part of the soul has its own cognitive and desiring aspects. Indeed an account comes out only in *Philebus*. In the *Timeaus* the parts or aspects of the soul were defined as divisible and indivisible nature of the parts. But Plato did not develop it well there. But the ontological ground used in *Philebus* was already introduced in *Timeaus*.

Regarding the category of pleasure Plato still keeps his tripartition as pure pleasure, pain and pleasure mostly connected together. But the distinction is made between pure pleasure demarcated from pleasure and pain.

Also Plato correlates this pleasurable aspect with cognitive abilities. Thus it becomes that reason interacts with pure pleasure, and pleasure interacts with opinions. In more detailed correspondence we

illustrate this as follows: Reason interacts with pure pleasure, pleasure correlates with true opinion and pain cooperates with false opinion. Thereby the dualistic principle is also there.

On the whole there is also dual distinction between the soul components that are Reason and Pleasure. And according to Plato it is better they are together and mixed properly, but when the faculties are separate the better one is clearly the Reason.

In *Philebus* Plato still classifies human kind into two categories: 'good people' who can be treated as philosophers whose soul are harmonic, and 'wicked people' who are non-philosophers with non-harmonic soul organisation. Thus *Eros* or rational desire is peculiar to philosophers and *epithumia* is more peculiar to the non-philosophers. But in terms of whole life or lifelong motivation Plato has also three kinds of life. These are the life of pleasure, the life of pain and a neutral life which is of neither pleasure nor pain.

At the end we can conclude that in Plato's psychology the dualistic principle of distinction underlies the division of soul inner structure and soul types.

The crucial point is that, besides the tripartition of soul, Plato, at the end of the *Republic*, at *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, in all of these dialogues, suggests his own doctrine. This doctrine is the methodological dualism, because he divides the soul, the human, and life, through the criteria of rationality. Thus he accepts only two kinds of psychological lives. The one is the philosophical life which is rational and the other is the non-philosophical, ordinary human life which is non-rational. He also divides the non-rational aspect of the soul into two types. The one is motivated by rational desire (*eros*, *mania*, or enthusiasm) the other by appetitive desire (*epithumiai*). Thereby applying the tripartite soul, Plato inclines to his dualistic position of soul and finally in the *Philebus* accepts this dualism. Thereby we agree with Stocks (1915) who explained the tripartite soul as diversity of function.

As Stocks (1915) remarked correctly about the partition of the soul, the parts are not always called as 'parts' (*merē*, or *moria*), but only occasionally. They are mostly called 'forms' (*eide*), 'kinds' (*genē*), 'characters' (*ēthē*), 'modes' (*tropoi*) and sometimes even souls (*psychai*). This leads to a more correct understanding, that the soul, as a whole, cannot have separate or independent parts in it; rather, the 'parts' perform different attributes of the one united or unique soul.

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### ХУРААНГУЙ

Энэхүү өгүүлэлд сэтгэлийн тухай Платоны онол Федр хэмээх диалогид хэрхэн хөгжиж буйг шинжлэн үзэх бөгөөд нэн ялангуяа сэтгэлийн ангилалын тухай авч үзэх юм. Платоны сэтгэл зүйн онолоор бол сэтгэл нь гурван хэсгээс бүрддэг гэсэн үзэл нь эрдэмтэдийн дунд нийтлэг байдаг. Тэр нь тухайл: хүсэл тачаал, ааг омог, оюун ухаан билээ. Тэгэхдээ Платоны дунд үеийн диалогуудад түүний онтологийн дуалист зарчим голчилдог бөгөөд тэр нь ертөнцийг оюунлаг санааны хийгээд биет материаллаг хэсэгт хуваагддагаар илэрдэг. Энэ зарчим нь янз бүрийн аспектүүдэд хэрэглэгддэг бөгөөд ялангуяа сэтгэлийн рационал бус хэсэгт оюунаг бус хэсэгт бас баримтлагддаг. Бидний олж авсан зүйл гэвэл Платоны "Төр улс" диалог дахь сэтгэлийн гурвалсан бүтэцээс ялгаа нь Федрт сэтгэлийн иррационал аспект нь мөн хоёр хуваагдаж эрос буюу философийн хайр мөн дур тачаал буюу эпитюмия гэсэн хоёр бүрэлдхүүн хэсэгтэй юм гэсэн дүгнэлтэд хүрч буй юм. Гэхдээ энэ нь Платоны сэтгэлийн гурвалсан бүтэцтэй огт зөрчилдөөгүй гэдэгийг дурдах нь зүйтэй. Харин энэ бол сэтгэлийн бүтцийг илүү нарийн түвшинд, өөр хэмжүүрээр авч үзсэн хэлбэр гэж ойлгогдохоор байгаа юм.

Гэсэн хэдий ч нарийн ажиглавал сэтгэлийн бүтцийг авч үзэхдээ Платон ийм дуалист хандалгаар авч үзэж байгаа нь түүний пифагорчуудаас авсан гэж хэлэгдэх гурвалсан ангиллаас илүүтэйгээр чухам өөрийнх нь шалгуур ангилал гэж үзэх үндэстэй байгаа юм. Түүнчлэн бид Платоны энэхүү Федр диалог нь бусад диалогуудтай харьцуулахад бидний авч үзэж буй асуудалд ямар онцлог байр суурьнаас хандсаныг тодорхойлж, бусад диалогуудтай харьцуулахад ямар дүгнэлт хийж болохыг гаргаж тавьсан болно.

Энэхүү судалгаанд Платоны диалогуудыг герменевтик аргыг ашиглахын зэрэгцээ эх зохиолыг бусад тайлбар зохиолуудтай харьцуулан судлах замаар авч үзсэн болно.