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MONGOLIA IN THE WORLD

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Mongolia is a unique country in our world. Why is this so? What determines its uniqueness? And to what extent is it also 'just another' country, like the nearly two hundred we have on earth nowadays? And if Mongolia resembles the average national state as well, what will be the impact of the global trends in the years to come? What will be the consequences then for Mongolia's position in the world community? What will be the effect on Mongolia's wellbeing? And are there any actions to remedy the problems the country will be faced with?

Mongolia is unique for – at least - two major reasons. The first one being the nomadic character of its population. Mongolia is the only country in the world where nomadism has not only determined its historical development, but also its present situation. Is nomadism a weakness or a strength? The answer to this question depends on the time frame we are using. In the past the mobility of the tribes and has been a strength in warfare, but with the coming of modern weaponry this roaming around turned into a weakness, as sedentary countries have more opportunities to invest in industries developing high technology. Another weakness came to the forefront the moment Mongolian and Turkish tribes occupied densely populated countries like China. The Mongols were like fish in a sea of Chinese. In order to control the indigenous population, the capital had to be transferred from Karakorum to Khanbaliq (Beijing) and this signalled the end of Mongolia as a power centre.

In the less populated areas of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, however, it was possible to destroy the cities and kill the people and

rule the remainders. It didn't work like that in the Middle Empire. It is no coincidence that Mongolian domination first faded in the East, while the Mongols and their Turkish vassals went on to play an important role in the West for centuries thereafter. In modern times the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongolians is being perceived as a weakness. But as the world becomes overpopulated elsewhere, and as environmental degradation will threaten the future of mankind, it might well be that Mongolia will appear to be a safe haven of purity around the middle of the century. Thanks to its nomadic character it may become one of the last remaining areas of purity in the world.

The other special feature of Mongolia is the uniqueness of its main hero and the imprint he left on its history and society. Chinggis Khan cannot be compared with any other leader in the world. None of the secular leaders left such a footprint on his country and on the Eurasian continent. The only one who might be comparable in stature is the Prophet Mohammed who rallied the Arab nomads, as Temudjin united the Mongol and Turkish tribes. But the Prophet and the Kagan are not comparable in the sense that the Prophet has been a spiritual leader as well. Then the Prophet used religion as a tactical device, while the Great Khan employed terror. Mohammed integrated the Arabs much more into the local population, while Chinggis tried to keep the two apart. It will be clear what the positive legacy of the Great Khan to Mongolia is the fact that he lifted the country into world history and this is one of the main reasons for Mongolia to have its own identity as an independent country today. All people who once built empires or strong states cannot be easily subdued. We can see this in Britain, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Cambodia, Ethiopia, etc. Like the Mongolians these people have a strong identity.

But Chinggis' successes weakened the homeland as he had to empty it for his expeditions to be successful. This is an old argument from socialist times but it isn't completely false. Another downside of his behaviour has been the cruelty against most of his foes, including innocent civilians. Tolerance for religion and ethnicity, especially shown by some of his heirs, does compensate a bit. The Pax Mongolica is a positive contribution to the world at large, but the costs were very high. The image of cruelty remains dominant in the perceptions of the non-Mongolian people. It is difficult for a country if his major hero could

be seen as a war-criminal by the international community. Especially that part of it that suffered a lot and constitutes now a major power in Asia: the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Both being quite relevant for Mongolia's Foreign Policy. Chinggis positive contributions, like the bringer of peace, stability and the regime of law, might easily be overshadowed. Furthermore the question might arise what Mongolia contributed to the world after the Chinggisides lost their thrones. Mongolia should revere the Khan of Khans, but it should not solely be identified with him. Mongolia should also stress its own strength. After all it is out of the peoples of Mongolia that the figure of Chinggis arose. Without Mongolian toughness and lifestyle he could never have succeeded. It is the people who conquered the empire, under his guidance for sure.

But Mongolia is also a state like any other in the sense that it has a territory with people living on it, a government being in control, and it has the ability to participate in the system of international relations. Like some other countries it survived not only because of the sacrifices of its population, but also because of the fact that it is bordered by powerful states. Major powers in need of a buffer for their security. However, this doesn't work if there is no real balance of power between the two contesting entities. Then history might be less gracious, like in the case of Tibet. As a small country in terms of population and economy, Mongolia does run the danger to be heavily influenced by China and Russia, but the danger to be eaten is clearly gone. Its geographic position and its enormous landmass are, however, both an asset and a liability.

As all small nation states the country has to keep its options open. In the sense of developing relations with as many countries as possible and participating in as many international organisations as it can handle. The more options Mongolia can generate, the more manoeuvrability it can create, the more cloud it will have. Here the old virtue of mobile warfare, nowadays in the sense of flexible diplomacy, is springing to mind. The vital questions of independence, interdependence and dependence are not only priorities to Mongolia, of course. Mongolia's position in the Asian heartland between two major sedentary powers is, and always has been, a reason for being independent, as well as dependent. In that sense Mongolia has a dual

nature, as it has one in looking East and West at the same time, being urbanised and nomadised as well, being modern and traditional, secular and religious, rich in natural resources and still poor in economic performance. But Mongolia has no ethnic rifts, and that again distinguishes it from its neighbours. And very much in a positive way, as its homogeneity is a strong factor in fostering stability today and in the future. Like in many other countries good governance is still a problem, although on the whole Mongolia's record on human rights implementation is quite good. As far as corruption and a free press are concerned, not to mention social welfare, Mongolia is not yet up to standards. But given its isolated position and especially the legacy from the past, this is understandable, though not excusable.

Let us return again to the question of Mongolia as an independent actor in international politics and economics. As we saw before, the position of the country is not an easy one. But this is true for many small countries around the world. Some of them were in a position to secure their future through partial integration with their neighbours. This is a paradoxical solution for the power problem. It is a package deal whereby some sovereignty has been sacrificed in order to secure power sharing in the region. Such a move does work in Europe. In view of the successes of the European Union so far, we might conclude that integration with more powerful states is an option. But you need to combine several major powers and several minor powers, more or less equal political and economic systems and levels of achievement. And this is not something we will easily find elsewhere in the world. East- and South-east Asia might be a case in point in the far reaching future, as the economies of some countries are slowly but truly becoming more synergetic. But political systems do not match at all. And a security umbrella like the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is lacking completely. Their are deep rifts along the Russian and Chinese borders, the Chinese and Indian frontiers, and even more along the Eastern coast of the Pacific. Economic interchange alone will not suffice to bridge these gaps.

The EU is more than an economic instrument to foster political cooperation and integration. After all European unity started off as the coal and steel union between France and Germany in order to have joint control over the natural resources needed to start a war. In that

sense the EU is very much a security arrangement. However, economic interdependency in itself is not enough to avoid war. Therefore explicit security cooperation is needed to keep the peace. Europe did not succeed until now to integrate substantial military security into the Union, although there are new developments that point in the direction of a possible military arm of the Union in the future. But Europe still needs the United States as a hegemonic integrator. A separate security arrangement, headed by a major foreign power is still a necessity to keep the balance. If the Peoples Republic is of the opinion that it should threaten Taiwan, then it will do so. Notwithstanding the fact that that Taiwan is the major outside investing power in Mainland China. Political priorities can still override such a relationship if security cooperation is lacking. But it is very doubtful if such arrangement can be foreseen in the near future and it is out of the question that the United States might play the same role in Asia as it does in Western en Central Europe.

The number of dominant powers is East Asia is the same as in Europe: three: China, Japan and Russia, while in Europe it is Germany, France and the United Kingdom. However, the power distance between the major powers in Asia and the smaller powers is far greater than in Europe and it has not been moderated by so many integrative factors. Integration with neighbours is therefore only an option as far as the economy is concerned, but not at all in the field of politics and security. For that part of its international politics Mongolia will have to rely on other powers in the world as well. Different from the times of the Great Khans, balancing is and will be the keyword for Mongolia's Foreign Policy today and in the coming decades.

Mongolia is not only turning to the world, but for sure the world is turning to Mongolia. The globalisation tendencies are not passing by this country, although it's relatively isolated position might keep it a bit out of the mainstream, for the moment. But as it is not in Mongolia's interest to remain outside this mainstream, as it will limit the countries' options and therefore it's independence if it doesn't try to be integrated in the world community, the effect of growing interdependency will inevitably fall upon the flocks of the Mongolian people.

What are the determining factors of globalisation? First of all the humanitarian dimension: more cross-cultural contacts, being good

for Mongolia's tourist industry and for the outlook of the average Mongolian on the outside world, and bad for Mongolia's ancient traditions. Secondly the economic wavelength: integration in the world economy. There are positive and negative sides to this: more prospects for economic growth, but for the time being also growing social inequality. Both factors will have an impact on political stability, be it in opposite directions. Thirdly the political stratum: integration into the world political forum and mutual security. This kind of integration might have overall positive effects, but it might also threaten the control of Mongolia over its own destiny.

The effects of the major trade-off between economic integration and the loss of sovereignty can be studied by observing the enfolding of the European Union. We may note here the decline of sovereignty is nowadays also connected to individual and collective human rights – minorities claiming autonomy or independence like in the Caucasus – as we see another major trade-off: between humanitarian affairs and politics annex security. As we noted before, there is no danger to Mongolian sovereignty from this trade-off. The main threat will be in the fact that Mongolia is a small country between two giants, but that is something that Mongolia is used to cope with, while globalisation will provide the country with counterbalancing opportunities. The best situation for Mongolia to be in, is for the two giants to live peaceful together, but not to closely together either. In order to have room for an autonomous Mongolian Foreign Policy, Russian and China should Live Apart Together (LAT).

What then are the main options of Mongolian Foreign policy in the near future? Or as somebody once said: 'What should be done?' It should be noted here that a lot can be done, that indeed Mongolia is in a situation to take its faith in its own hands, be it sometimes a difficult uphill struggle. Therefore Mongolia needs:

1. A stable democracy represented by a body politic with integrity, supported by an effective bureaucracy, capable of representing Mongolia at the highest levels in the world;
2. A diplomatic service working on the integration of Mongolia in the Asian economic sphere, using as much as possible the bandwagon effect of the East-Asian economic upswing;
3. A diplomatic service working on the establishment of

organisations to regulate the economic integration of Mongolia into the Asian economic system;

4. A diplomatic service working on the establishment of some kind of security arrangements, -guarantees, and/or -organisation to sustain Mongolia's position as an independent actor in the Asian Theatre, and
5. A diplomatic service using the position of Mongolia as a non-threatening, strategically located, power to create the bilateral and multilateral networks that are absolutely vital to Mongolia's survival.

Mongolia's future will be bright again, but not thanks to one man, but to one people, and to the overall tendencies in the international system. It is therefore absolutely essential for the Mongolian civil service, and Mongolian diplomacy in particular, to be as trained as well as possible. The effectiveness of the Mongolian diplomat is one of the factors in determining the in(ter)dependency of the Mongolian State among the states of the world. There is a Mongolian contribution to be made to a world growing together. Mongolia's strength is not so much on its quantity of people or on its substantial Gross National Product. It will therefore have to be found in the quality of the people and in Mongolia's vast territory. The people will have to defend the national interests by being very assertive, like in the time of the Great Khans, but in a peaceful way this time. This assertiveness and competitiveness will have to compensate for Mongolia's relative weakness in power resources. However, given the enormous landmass and its strategic location, Mongolian diplomats can use this asset to work out a more secure Asia. In order to create the opportunities for security arrangements on the Asian continent, agreements and structures that will be in the interest of the state and of the Mongolian people.

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THE OPENING OF KOREA: THE CASE OF KOREAN – GERMAN RELATIONS

SFS/NUM

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1. Introduction

"His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, in the name of the German Empire, and His Majesty the King of Korea, being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of friendship and commerce between their respective dominions, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for that purpose...". Those are the words marking the official begin of relations Korea and Germany on November 26th, 1883.

These Korean-German relations never were of such decisive interests for German politics as were, for instance, German-Chinese or German-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, Korea at the end of the 19th century was a natural object of special strategic and economic interest for the German Empire, which was seeking to extend its influence in the Far East.

What was the political situation like in the time the treaty was signed in 1883? This report will discuss due to religious issues following the expedition to Korea of the first German expeditions in 1867, and the conclusion of the German-Korean Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, that developed between the two countries.

The Opening of Korea up to 1882

area in the first place was an interest of Japan. It was not new markets in the Far East, as they were more than all other national industrial in the the humanita

region. But in spite of that, the first contacts between Korea and Western powers a rose from incidents caused by Russian, French and American ships. In 1866, for example, a French fleet was sent to Korea in revenge for the murder of some French Roman Catholic missionaries, and in 1868 an American merchant ship, the "General Sherman", sailed up the Taedong River into the interior of the country. But neither of the expeditions had any success in establishing trade or diplomatic contacts between Korea and other powers. The first treaty to be signed by Korea itself was a Japanese – Korean treaty of friendship and commerce dating from Feb. 26th, 1876, the so-called Treaty of Kanghwa. The most important clause in it stated that Korea, being an independent state, enjoyed the same sovereign rights as Japan. That clause was mainly addressed to the Chinese interests in Korea, which were in fact countering the Japanese attempts to come into contact with Korea, as China was not willing to give up suzerainty over Korea without gain. Since that treaty Korea has been an object of contest between China and Japan, and all following Korean struggles, internal as well as external, can be reduced to that decision of political interests.

The Chinese interest now was to open Korea to powers other than Japan, especially Western nations, to avoid a misbalance of foreign influence with a Japan a Japanese's preponderance. The first result of those efforts was the treaty of Tientsin between Korea and the United States, signed in 1882 with the Chinese viceroy as an intermediary. But that treaty also held fast to the clause of Korea's total independence of China. Following that pattern treaties between Korea on one side and England, Italy, Russia, France and Germany on the other hand were signed between 1882 and 1886.

3. The Expeditions of Ernst Oppert in 1867

This is good point to interrupt the account of political relations between Korea and Germany and to report on expedition which took place under the guidance of the German Jewish marchant. Ernst Oppert, in the year 1867. The expedition started in April 1867 from Shanghai with the German ships "China" and "Greta", which were