

new newspaper "Mongolyn Unen" was published and a national news agency "Mongolyn tsahlgan medeeni gazar" was established, in 1924 the youth and military newspapers were printed, in 1928 the Trade Union newspaper was published, in 1934 a national radio broadcasting was established, in 1935 a national film production was founded and in 1967 the Mongolian television was founded. And by the end of 1980's Mongolia had 35 newspapers and 46 magazines and journals. (2,p.3) The Media of that period could not develop further due to the one-party ideological censorship.

The situation of Media has completely changed with the drastic changes of the country in the 1990's. For example, 5 TV studios broadcast every day, 2 cable TV stations showed the world main news and various entertainment networks, except national Radio programs, several FM radio stations (all private) were established, and dozens of news and information agencies were registered. By the middle of 1998, 700 newspapers and 150 magazines and journals were published in this country.

In August of 1998, the Parliament issued the "Law on freedom of publicity and information", which restricted any censorship, released public information agencies and gave freedom to publicity. It shows that Media of the country will develop following the principles of the democratic society.

Conclusion

Mongolia of the last decade of the 20th century saw the flowering of freedom of expression in her Media and had a new direction in her political life and new sentiments in her durable traditional culture.

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HOW TO DEAL WITH EMERGING POWERS?

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The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire followed by peaceful transition to democracy of the East European and Asian socialist countries challenged the decency of the theories of international relations. No one would argue that most prominent scholars of international relations studies failed to foresee the disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of the bipolar system of international relations and only a few people, the great Russian chess master Garry Gasparov among them, anticipated the unification of two Germanys, collapse of the Soviet empire, and changes in the world political order. In the world of great uncertainty caused by these recent changes the theorists are attempting to find proper answers for the past and anticipate proper solutions for the future development. The future of the world will mostly depend on the policies of the major powers, their interrelations and alliances. In this short essay, exploring the basic concepts of theories of international relations, I will try to analyze the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China and its role in enhancing the regional stability.

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union the United States remains the only superpower with dominant influence on world policy though theorists of realist school would argue that existence of only superpower without a challenger is not possible. Christopher Layne believes that "because only the United States possesses imposing strength in all categories of great power capability, it enjoys a preeminent role in international politics."¹ But history shows that unipolar system never

¹ Christopher Layne. The Unipolar Illusion. p.244.

lasted long due to the rise of other powers "to challenge the powers and standing of the hegemon."² One of the countries, which might challenge American dominance in the Asia Pacific region and probably on the world arena, is China. The relations between these two countries can not be characterized by a single concept. In last five decades after the World War II the relationship witnessed rise and fall, relative understanding and hostility, cooperation and nearly total isolation.

China historically had far-reaching ambitions and if its economic and military capabilities allow to become dominant power in Asia, the United States have to develop a policy to protect its national interests in the region. "The debate over the 'China threat' closely resembles the disagreements over United States policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Hard-liners and moderates disagree about Beijing's capabilities and about whether American aims would be best served by containing or engaging China." Some political scientists argue that the United States had not had clear policy toward China even during the Cold War era. Bipolar system had relatively simple structure, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union dividing the world into their spheres of influence and as Kenneth Waltz pointed out "the United States, and the Soviet Union as well, have more reason to be satisfied with the status quo than most earlier great powers had."³ This system of international relations was quite stable due to the balance of power, clear understanding of each other's intentions and capabilities, and total economic independence of two superpowers.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union put an end to the relatively stable, simple bipolar system and created political and power vacuum. Current international environment is favorable for China to transform "itself into a superpower at a time when the United States has settled snugly into the belief that it is the only superpower in the world."⁴ There is no consensus among the scholars if China is 'an emerging super or great power' or simply big third world country with huge potentials. In many cases China's economic and military capabilities and potential are gravely exaggerated. China has achieved enormous

economic growth in last twenty years since it had started to implement the policy of "four modernizations" under Deng Xiaoping. Though in the last decade Chinese economy had grown at annual rate of more than ten percent, lack of modern technology, poor industrial base, one of the lowest labor productivity in the world, undeveloped infrastructure, the "absence of a legal and institutional framework needed for a modern market economy and unstable political and social institutional arrangements"⁵ will seriously affect the future economic progress.

Even more diverse assessments of the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) can be detected. Despite of its huge strength of more than three million and its rapid build-up "China does not expect to be a major military power until well into the next century."⁶ On the other hand, continuous efforts by Chinese leadership to enhance the military strength should be taken into account. China is one of the few countries in the region steadily increasing its defense expenditures in the last decade. Some military analysts estimate the increase in China's defense budgets by 40 percent in real terms since 1988. China is modernizing the PLA not only by buying some sophisticated weapons from abroad but simultaneously updating its military-industrial complex. Even now Chinese military industry is capable to produce a wide range of fairly sophisticated systems they are selling on the world market. There is no doubt about the intentions of China's military modernization program – to have a modern multifaceted force structure and "although at present backward and limited, China will continue to close the gap and develop a flexible and increasingly sophisticated force structure."⁷ Considering the future trends of PLA developments, the former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry at the Pacific Basin Economic Council in May 1996 stated that "containment would actually undermine our security, not help it. It would push China to accelerate its defense modernization, contributing to regional arms races and increasing the likelihood of regional armed conflict."

² The Cold War and After. p.18

³ Mueller. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons. p.47

⁴ Destructive engagement. The New Republic. p.9

⁵ Sheng Li Jun. Why China May Not Be Dominant World Power. Singapore Straits Times. p.21

⁶ George Melloan. China's Balance of Power Politics in Asia.

⁷ George Melloan. China's Balance of Power Politics in Asia.

In last several years the U.S. military leadership has taken concrete steps to engage the PLA at all levels, "seeking through dialogue to increase transparency in Chinese defense expenditure, doctrine, deployments, and security perspectives; exchanging personnel between national military units, service academies and staff colleges; understanding, in time, joint maneuvers and other confidence-building and transparency-enhancing measures; and maintaining an ongoing dialogue on international security trends and bilateral defense interests at the highest level of the two military establishments."⁸ But from the statements made by American political and military high ranking officials it is obvious that engagement does not mean that the United States would "acquiesce in policies or actions with which it disagrees." Serious disagreements exist in the issues of trade, human rights, arms sales, and U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-Japan relations. Though since 1972 the United States has been pursuing the policy of "one China" and several joint communiques on the subject were signed between the two countries, the visit of the Taiwanese president Lee Tenghui to the States in 1997, presidential elections in Taiwan and related large-scale military exercises with life-firing of missiles in Taiwan Strait by the PLA aggravated the relations. It is not the first time Chinese leaders use the PLA as a tool in their political game. The heavy artillery bombardments of Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu by the PLA in 1954 during the U.S.-Taiwan negotiations on Mutual Defense Treaty and again in 1958 to restore ambassadorial talks were used mostly to exert political pressure but not for real invasion. China's continued refusal to renounce the potential use of force in reunifying Taiwan is not conducive to stability in the Asia and Pacific region.

Another aspect of tensions between the two militaries is nuclear nonproliferation. Though China became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Chemical Weapons Convention, China's delivery of nuclear technology to Pakistan, and military and nuclear cooperation with Iran is major concern. During bipolar international system nuclear weapons were considered as one of the powerful means of deterrence, thus contributing to world stability. Carl Kaysen argues that "... the profound

revolution in the technology of war brought by nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long range ballistic missiles... have amplified the message of this century's war experiences by many decibels, and set it firmly in the minds of the wide public as well as those of political and military leaders."⁹ In current multipolar environment more and more nations gravitate toward going nuclear to ensure their security. John Mearshheimer argues that "nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent for states that feel threatened by rival powers"¹⁰ and the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan confirm this. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in last 50 years and China's supply of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan aggravated the situation. It is likely that other states will follow India's example in acquiring nuclear weapons. With time, as nuclear weapons spread more widely, the influence of great powers on nonproliferation issues will probably decline.

Analyzing the U.S.-China relationship only from the U.S. perspective seems to be incomplete. It is two way relationship and China's response to American initiatives has tremendous influence in shaping the U.S. policy. Interestingly, "China was able to reverse its alignment twice during the Cold War without any more dramatic effect upon the position of the superpowers."¹¹ American policy toward China has been most successful when the great complexity of the country with rich historical background was taken into account. Taking "one China" policy as the basic principle, "the Clinton Administration's approach to China is guided by three tenets: first, China's development as a secure, open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the U.S.; second, support to China's full integration and its active participation in the international community; third, protection of the U.S. interests when necessary."¹² The attempts to isolate China has not been effective and in most cases worsened the relations between the countries and increased tension and instability in the region. The scholars believe that "the U.S. and China share many interests that can only be served when two countries deal constructively and openly

⁸ David Shambaugh, *China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger*, p. 9

⁹ Kaysen, *Is War Obsolete*, p. 100

¹⁰ Joan Mearshheimer, *Why the Global Arms Race Seems Sure to Spread*.

¹¹ Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 12

¹² Warren Christopher, *American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship*

with each other."¹³ In fact there are not feasible means to isolate the world's largest emerging market with the population well over one billion.

Chinese leaders repeatedly stated their peaceful intentions. China's president Jiang Zemin told the Republic of Korea's National Assembly in November 1995 that "to allege that a stronger China will pose a threat to other countries is groundless. China will never take part in an arms race, never engage in expansion, and never seek hegemony." Though there is no containment policy in the Clinton Administration, Chinese leaders truly believe that the U.S. is seeking all ways to block China's emergence. They worry that "although their economy is growing and they would like to become a dominant regional power in the next century, for the next decade or two they see their security situation – their national integrity, their freedom of action and their political way of life – as threatened by the world's sole remaining superpower."¹⁴ This statement clearly indicates the intention of China's leaders to use anti American sentiments for solving domestic problems and justifying increasing nationalism. As the influence of the Communist party is diminishing after Den's death, China leadership is "turning to nationalism to rally their country and legitimate their hold on power."¹⁵ On the other hand, some Chinese leaders assume that the U.S. has less interest in China due to diminution of need for geopolitical balancing. China is also concerned that the United States alliances in the region, the U.S.-Japan defense agreement signed in April 1996 in particular, could be used to contain China.

In conclusion, what U.S. policy toward China, engagement or containment, will serve best the common goals of enhancing security in Asia? No doubt that China is an emerging great power and a confrontation with it might lead to unpredictable consequences. Containment policy did not work in the past and only worsened mistrust and misunderstanding between the two countries. Five years ago Clinton Administration laid the foundation for the engagement policy by renewing China's Most Favored Nation trade status and by delinking

U.S-China relations from human rights issue. A number of positive outcomes in sensitive areas, nonproliferation in particular, have been achieved. China has made a public commitment not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and agreed to conduct a series of important negotiations on export control policies. Though the PLA will not for the foreseeable future have the capability to challenge U.S. national security directly, some concrete steps to engage the Chinese military have been quite successful. Reciprocal high level military visits, including Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of General Staffs, were important in establishing practical cooperation between two militaries. President Clinton's upcoming visit to Beijing later this month is a clear indication of the U.S. intentions to further engage China diplomatically and economically. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry put it "Engagement is not a favor to China, it is a favor for ourselves, American security interests, and – more than incidentally – the security interest of the entire region."

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